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The Internet

Hacking Web Services 228

siduri writes "Udi Manber, chief scientist at Yahoo!, gave a great talk on the kinds of hacks that Yahoo sees at the IEEE's Symposium on Security and Privacy. I wrote an overview of his talk for Dr. Dobb's Journal. While some of the message is well-known stuff (like that people will spend a lot of time hacking the most trivial things), the details of what Yahoo has to deal with are really pretty interesting."
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Hacking Web Services

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  • by taya0001 ( 457928 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:05PM (#3552650)
    I know that someone has been hacking google for the past few years about once a week. Always changing the google logo(jk). I guess google is just powerless to protect themselves
  • by jeffy124 ( 453342 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:05PM (#3552653) Homepage Journal
    from the article: "If you have any kind of rating, people go to all kinds of trouble to get that rating in an illegitimate way,"

    hmm. sounds like they're describing karma whores
  • Terminology (Score:3, Insightful)

    by The Ape With No Name ( 213531 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:06PM (#3552658) Homepage
    Why on earth does this guy call "violating security" of web services "hacking?" I read this article expecting to hear about some nuanced application hacks for XSLT or SOAP or general "Web Services" not a security "lookout!" article. This should be filed in the "no shit" department. If you leave a service open which can be connected to, be it a socket or a web form, somebody will start passing date to it to see what works and doesn't work.
    • Re:Terminology (Score:3, Informative)

      by Tony-A ( 29931 )
      Why on earth does this guy call "violating security" of web services "hacking?"
      Because it's so much easier than actually fixing anything.
  • by macsox ( 236590 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:07PM (#3552667) Journal
    at least according to the yahoo guy.

    my personal site (which is [pbump.net]) grabs headlines and quotes from yahoo for my personal use using a perl script. solution? simple.

    yahoo (like the record companies) should provide a resource for me to get this text cheaply (and quickly), and i'll pay them for it. the demand is there. basic economics dictates that people provide a supply.

    now, i understand they are talking about thieves, on the whole, but it seems easy enough to track massive hits from another server and then to block it. i mean, it's 2002. let's fix these problems.
    • note to self: </em> is a useful tag.
    • You said that you were doing it for personal use. His problem is with people who do it, and then re-sell it, or give it away, to the world.
    • I listened to a presentation on C# by a Microsoft developer evangelist last year. One interesting use of .Net he mentioned was basically what you're describing - a provider publishes the data over the web in a defined format so you can get and redisplay it however you want, possibly paying on a per transaction basis.

      The example he used was screen scraping a map of yahoo.

      It's nice to see google embrace this concept [google.com].
    • by mborland ( 209597 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:26PM (#3552820)
      now, i understand they are talking about thieves, on the whole, but it seems easy enough to track massive hits from another server and then to block it. i mean, it's 2002. let's fix these problems.

      Often, it's not a matter of restricting access. The description of the E-Bay situation where other people would generate bad logins as a competitor to lock them out is a good example. You need to provide this functionality, to keep from having your client's accounts broken into. Yet, that very policy can be used effectively as a denial of service against your clients.

      I run into sysadmins who assume that issues are binary--something is bad, cut it off; something is good, allow it. Usually more complex applications require much more of an understanding of a balance between business functionality and security. In the case of E-Bay and user lockout, there is no exact solution--you need to satisfy two opposing interests--so you make a compromise between the two and try to forge a workable solution.

      I think the biggest challenge for the security community will be how to modify their practices (and others') to be able to quantify risk in applications so that businesses can make good functional decisions. Security teams have largely focused on perimeter security and things like web parameter checking, but they don't usually stray into the gray area of functional requirements--or if they do, usually only to, as some have put it, cut the wings off flies.

      So, to get back to the original point of the post--it's not so easy to solve as just blocking traffic. Nope, sorry, it's a lot more work than that.

      • So, to get back to the original point of the post--it's not so easy to solve as just blocking traffic. Nope, sorry, it's a lot more work than that.


        but that negates my whole argument! be compassionate!
      • by Fulcrum of Evil ( 560260 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:57PM (#3553050)

        In the case of E-Bay and user lockout, there is no exact solution

        In this case, a lockout that is specific to remote address or address block might be useful. Add in some checks for stuff like AOL (different IP each connect and a pile of users) and dialup blocks (lockout a class C network for that login to frustrate redial attempts) and keep stats on where a user comes from (repeated attempts from a commonly used net block may be treated more leniently and trigger an email to the user's registered address, whereas an unusual address generates a longer lockout and no email to the user).

      • by Dodger_ ( 51556 )
        Couldn't ebay break apart the login username from the bidding username? This wouldn't eliminate the problem, but it could certainly help since the attacker wouldn't immediately know which account to attempt to block out through bad access violations.
    • yahoo (like the record companies) should provide a resource for me to get this text cheaply (and quickly), and i'll pay them for it


      I'll provide you access to my yahoo headline-grabbing service for $10/day... what a deal!
  • by cybrpnk2 ( 579066 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:08PM (#3552679) Homepage
    The IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy [ieee-security.org] is one of the longest-running forums on this topic and is well worth being aware of. The papers for the 2002 session are on CD-ROM [computer.org]; so is a compilation of those from 1980-1999 [computer.org]...
  • Yahoo's problems... (Score:5, Informative)

    by Jace of Fuse! ( 72042 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:20PM (#3552769) Homepage
    Yahoo's problems are massive, and I think it's good that at least SOME people at Yahoo realize it, even though I'm still not convinced they are aware of the full scale of the problem.

    After all, if you chat with Yahoo's service, you're eventually going to be booted off by another user. Some of the methods users use to exploit the system and kick off other users are clever, some are not so clever.

    One method involves running a program easily downloaded off of the internet and typing in the desired victims name. It's your basic "Punter". Some of the programs available are effective at removing users of Yahoo's Messenger, while a few of the more recent ones do a good job taking out users who use 3rd party Yahoo clients, or even Yahoo's web-based Java client.

    These methods of exploitation are half-way understandable, though I don't see why Yahoo hasn't worked to block the attacks in the same way that AOL has with AIM.

    The other method, plain old boot-text, is simply unacceptable.

    If I were chatting with someone using Yahoo Messenger and they annoyed me, all I would have to do is send them a single URL with an unrealistically long domain name in it, and their Yahoo Messenger will crash. A URL such as www.xxxxx.com with about 400 to 500 X's in the name will work nicely.

    It's a relatively simple matter for the end user to set up a personal word-filter on their messenger and block out all occurences of "www." which effectively makes them invulnerable to this attack, but that is not the issue. The issue is, that if Yahoo has such easily exploitable end-user software, I'm very worried about the quality of their security as a whole.

    Think about it.
    • if Yahoo has such easily exploitable end-user software, I'm very worried about the quality of their security as a whole.

      The article is not about (security related to) instant messaging, but e.g. bots signing up for a dozen Yahoo E-mail accounts, which use them for spam, people grabbing their stock quotes every fifth minute and re-publish them on their own site, people who do password attacks on auction accounts to trigger a lock-out, so that the bidder can't place any new bids during the last hour of the action etc.

  • by lugonn ( 555020 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:27PM (#3552828)
    The problem with the internet is you can NEVER lock it down. There will ALWAYS be hax0rs causing/solving problems. The is NO gaurantee. It's all as is. As in:
    "Oh! somebody stole your credit card number from our database...Sorry...we've been trying to fix that. In the meantime, here's a coupon for a free CD."

    The only way to secure a transaction/service is to use physical ID/presense. So go shopping at the mall, and share ideas online. Simple solution to a complex problem.

    "Make it by hand, break it by hand"

    • Based on your logic we shouldn't have doors because someone will always be able to break them down.
    • You're assuming that the problem is people stealing credit card numbers. That doesn't happen at the mall? (Hint: it does.)

      You had a great post up until you started advocating shopping at the mall. That doesn't solve anything. It just makes your credit card number a tiny bit harder to steal.

      Why should I really care if someone steals my credit card number anyways? It's not my problem. It's the credit card company's problem. If someone charges hundreds of dollars of merchandise on my card without my authorization, I call the credit card company and the police, report it to both of them, then go on my merry way without another thought. Yes, this did happen to me. Yes, this is exactly what I did. No, I wasn't lucky. Yes, it really is this simple, and, no, there is no such thing as "identity theft".

      I never even understood where this whole "identity theft" thing came from. I don't lose anything. I still have my identity, regardless of how many other people have fake ID's that share my name. For a bunch of people who cry foul at the word "piracy", I'd expect the same outcry over "identity theft".

      Oh well. The real problem here is that people are cheating. They cheat at games, they cheat at auctions, they cheat at score rankings, and they cheat on their taxes. The solution is get people to stop cheating. Good luck... it's not a technological problem; it's a problem with society.

      I don't believe in a person with a problem
      If there's a problem, it's a problem with society
      - KMFDM


      • and, no, there is no such thing as "identity theft".

        From that ignorant statement right there, I can tell you have no idea what "identity theft" is.

        Tell me what you call it then, when somebody very expertly gains illegal access to every important piece of personal information that you have, and then make enormous fraudlent loans, purchases, and applications for credit cards whilst assuming your identity.

        This exact thing happened to a very close friend of mine and it turned her life into a living hell. She has paid thousands of dollars in lawyers fees trying to get her financial status back on track and it's looking like it will never return to 100% normal.

        A stolen credit card number is not identify theft. Identity theft occurs when a criminal assumes your whole identity: social security number, credit background, you name it. With that kind of information, they can apply for loans and open various types of accounts. It's not a simple matter of calling the credit card company and having them do all the work for you while you sit on your couch and sip lemonade as you apparently did.

        And you can't just call up each company where the criminal did his business under your identity... First off, you have no idea which companies were involved until (for example) you get a bill collector calling you asking why you haven't yet paid the full balance for that $80,000 sports car.

        You have absolutely no idea how well-connected businesses are when it comes to money... The aforementioned friend is still getting refusals from businesses and the occasional bank because of the identity theft. It's a lot easier for companies to mark a particular name and SSN down as an abuser of finances than it is to remove them from the same files.

        My friend is not the only one. While there is all kinds of advice out there on the prevention of identity theft, there are no organizations that will help you recover after the damage has been done.

        Trying to equate identity theft with piracy is almost the most absurd, stupid, and asinine things I've ever read on this website. Piracy (almost always) hurts no one whereas identity theft is impossible to totally recover from.
    • The problem with the western territories is that they are lawless lands! You'll never have enough Sherrif's to protect the cities, you'll never have enough US Marshal's to hunt down all the outlaws, you'll never have enough hunters to kill all the wolves, and let's not even forget about those blasted Indians! Nobody will ever be able to establish a good colony in those lands...

    • The only way to secure a transaction/service is to use physical ID/presense. So go shopping at the mall, and share ideas online. Simple solution to a complex problem.

      Sorry, but I trust 128-bit SSL encryption about 1000 times more than I trust the Pimply-Faced Human Sales Proxy at Babbages or Sam Goody. I absolutely hate using my credit card at physical stores because I know how easy it is for them to jot down the number & expiration date or take home copies of the reciepts and trade the numbers online. (Hint: I know, because I once knew a person who did this several times. No, he didn't get caught because he wisely decided not to make a living out of it.)

      Yes, even the most wired online store has humans somewhere behind it, but many online stores never keep a copy of your credit card number anywhere... Once the number is validated and your account charged, the purchasing server forgets about it. This is the way it should be for physical stores as well, but I have yet to see one operate in this manner.

      I only use my credit card at retail locations if the bill is going to be over $60. 90% of the time I know what I'm going to be buying and how much it will cost before I go into a store. It's a trivial excercise to stop by the ATM and get whatever I need before doing my shopping.

      What really pisses me off is restaurants that print your friggen credit card number right on the damned receipt! Reason #1 that I pay cash at all restaurants now too.
  • people are still registering for massive numbers of accounts. "As far as I can tell, they're just doing it by hand. They're sitting there all day doing it by hand," he said. So he's considering changing the registration test to a simple arithmetic problem. It won't stop the mass registrations, but he might be able to get the abusers to perform distributed computing tasks for him.

    HAH! That is really clever. Of course there isn't much computing power there, and if Yahoo! did harness it they would resell it and/or generally become sleazy about it, but at first blush, that's pretty funny. He should patent it (ha ha).

    • by marcus ( 1916 )
      Have the humans do something that machines can't do very well, say image recognition and/or categorization.

      A simple "Tell me about this picture" and an associated image and a text box would do. If the text submitted does not match a previously stored description well enough, no deal.

      Every one in five or so, put out a new, previously un-cataloged, image and log the description...That would also be an easy way to beef up their image search engine.

    • There are a lot of tasks that humans can do quicker and more accurately than computers. Image and voice recognition is one of those things.

      For example: let's imagine a situation where you're signing up for an account and I flash 9 images on the screen with an empty text box beneath each. The user identifies each image with one word and then the server checks the text against a word list. If the response is not a valid word, the user is prompted for a word..

      The trick would be verifying that the responses are not automated. This might not work very well, but it's an example of a distributed task that would work well..

    • Yeah, this was the funniest thing I've read in a while. Harnessing the power of spam <giggle/>.

      Sort of the net equivalent of generating electricity by damming a large river, with the added bonus of improving the environment!

  • by tps12 ( 105590 )
    I HERD YUO COUD HAXOR ADN CHAT ON TEH INTARWEB? Apparently having to scroll down to read this is less lame than just the above line of caps text.
  • by rhadamanthus ( 200665 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:38PM (#3552909)
    But he dismissed legal solutions altogether, saying that measures like anti-spam legislation are completely ineffective. "This has to be solved technically, not legally," he warned. "If we can't solve these problems, we'll see less and less services."

    I am unsure if here he is saying that anti-spam legislation will be ineffective, or if the "right to spam" should not be outlawed by lawmakers. I would imagine the former is what he meant, since obviously, having the U.S. outlaw spam will do nothing to stop spammers in other countries, and probably do little to stop spammers here in the states either....

    Solving the spam problem technically seems to be impossible though. People have been trying to do that forever. I find it very poignant that in the same passage he says that spam could kill off services if it continues to be unstoppable.


    ---------------rhad
    • Re: AntiSpam lawmaking

      Let's count them:
      1 spam from the US, 9 spams from taiwan, 1 real email. 1 spam from the US, 9 spams from china, 1 real email. 1 spam from the US, 9 spams from korea, 2 real emails.

      Banning US spam is not going to help much
    • Exactly! We should repeal every law on the books. They don't stop criminals from committing crimes, and everyone knows that's why we have laws.
    • by ChaosDiscordSimple ( 41155 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @04:27PM (#3553301) Homepage
      Solving the spam problem technically seems to be impossible though. People have been trying to do that forever.

      The solution exists, it's just that the transition to the solution will be painful, so we're desperately trying to avoid it.

      The solution is whitelists and "postage".

      Put all your friends in a whitelist. Main from them is delivered instantly.

      Anyone else who emails you gets an autoreponse, "I don't know you. To ensure that you're a real human being, you'll to need to run the postage program to get the result for the code ABAASDFFEFEF". The program needs to be open source and easily verifyable for security reasons. The program solves some problems that is hard to compute (say 60 seconds), but easy to verify. One example would be a brute for cypher break on a simple cypher. The senders email client can handle this autoreponse automatically, shielding the sender from needing to deal with it (Gee, my computer gets slow for a bit when I email someone new). Spammers, on the other hand, would need to either limit their spamming so they have time to generate valid responses, or would need to invest in expensive hardware to generate the responses fast enough. End result: It's no longer cheap and easy spam.

      There are a few other details to make mailing lists feasible, but it's doable.

      However, this effort would require everyone to upgrade their mail clients or to use external programs to manage this. Given that extremely slow adaptation of other email security features, I'm not optimistic.[B

      • "The solution exists, it's just that the transition to the solution will be painful, so we're desperately trying to avoid it."

        Yes, this is what I was getting at in my original post. The transition could have been done years ago, but getting a switch to take place is not easy to do. Another post addressed this as well.

        Or we could just nuke all the spammers :)


        ----------rhad
      • Note that postage is basically a pay-to-play system. Will it discriminate against people accessing the Internet on Pentium 1s?
        • Note that postage is basically a pay-to-play system. Will it discriminate against people accessing the Internet on Pentium 1s?

          I was a bit hand-wavy. (Ooh, look at me, I'm a futurist!)

          The key is to just add a very small cost. The advantage using CPU time as the cost is that it's easy to automate. However you have a good point.

          If we don't change anything else, yes, mail from slower machines will take longer to be delivered. A problem that takes my computer a minute might take a lesser machine ten minutes. However, it's not that terrible, you should be adding friends, coworkers and other people you want to get email from to your whitelist, so they'll be paying the penalty only once. In fact, this can be automated as well: anyone who answers the question one can either be added to your whitelist (and if you later decide you change your mind, moved to a blacklist). Or your mail reader could return a ticket to avoid the answer after answering the question once. Again, you could revoke a ticket if you determined someone was harassing you.

          The other solution is to skip computers and force human interaction. Each user would generate a simple puzzle that is hard for computers to parse. The sender will get the puzzle back and his email won't go though until he answers it. You would only need one puzzle, the key is that it needs to be hard to parse with a computer. For example "What is 6 times seven? Add one to the result. Subtract three. Repeat the second step with a tenfold larger number."

      • My business relies on people finding my website, then emailing me directly. NONE of my prospective clients would try again if they got a "who are you?" message back that they then had to do something special to reply to so I would see their message.

        Yesterday I was on the wrong end of such a bot myself. I emailed the owner of some linux-related site, and got back an autoresponse that informed me I had to reply with a certain string in the subject to get past the spam killer. So I did -- and got an automated "rejection" message. Will I try again? No. If the guy is that friggin' paranoid, to hell with his product.

        • I emailed the owner of some linux-related site, and got back an autoresponse ... Will I try again? No. If the guy is that friggin' paranoid, to hell with his product.

          I usually come to the same conclusion myself when it comes to various barriers to web-shopping (e.g. excessive registration/requirement to use java(script)/doesn't work with any browser I use on Linux/etc.)

          However, depending on the product, you could look at it this way: if the guy is that careful about his email, perhaps that reflects well on how careful he is with his product. I know it works the other way - when I see a site that looks shoddily constructed or where the mailto links are to aol/hotmail/whatever domains, I get leery.

          • Yeah, that's my response exactly to websites that give my *preferred* (older) browser a hard time -- nothing there I can't get easier somewhere else!

            As to individuals, I've had enough firsthand experience with that sort of paranoia (particularly among coders) that I've learned it means the person is going to be too much hassle to deal with, no matter how wonderful his product.

            (Gotta run, the Edison guy is here to fix the power pole..)

  • by g4dget ( 579145 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:42PM (#3552932)
    But he dismissed legal solutions altogether, saying that measures like anti-spam legislation are completely ineffective. "This has to be solved technically, not legally," he warned. "If we can't solve these problems, we'll see less and less services."

    Yahoo!'s problems are no different from those brick-and-mortar retailers have with loss leaders and promotions: if you give something away at a loss, there is a good chance that others will find it profitable to get lots of it and resell it. It's not a security problem, it's a problem with the business model. Welcome to the real world.

    Yahoo! may want to continue to bask in the glory of having many millions of users, but if they want stop these problems, all they have to do is charge for all of their services. The choice is really theirs.

    Don't get me wrong: I like Yahoo! services and I think it would be great if they continue to be free. But I really worry when Manber uses terms like "theft" and "security" for a problem that has very little to do with "theft" and "security". Fortunately, Manber himself isn't calling for a legal solution, but management and lawmakers may be less understanding of the issues involved.

    • I went to this talk (and this conference). He basically said that a lot of attacks are just sequences of actions, any of which individually are not a problem, but when combined are a problem. I'd call that a "security" issue. The result is that he can't offer certain services. There's a social good issue there, and an interstate commerce issue, so Congress could easily claim jurisdiction. Not that I'm suggesting that that's the right solution...

      As for "theft," whether you like it or not, taking my data and selling it without permission is theft. Yes, spyware is theft; reposting NYT articles on /. is also theft. Selling premium services is a valid business model; some people subscribe once, scrape the screen, and have their own premium service. If that isn't "theft," you've effectively said that "information has no owner," in which case you have no recourse for your ISP selling all your packets.
  • by slykens ( 85844 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:43PM (#3552939)
    From the article:

    During hotly contested auctions, some users will mount password attacks on other bidder's accounts an hour before the end of the auction -- not to actually gain access, but merely to trigger a security lockout, thereby ensuring that the legitimate user cannot place last-minute bids.

    I realize how ridiculously easy it is to get a new IP address on a dialup system or in a facility where someone has access to many addresses but wouldn't a simple IP block after so many attempts help discourage the casual DoS but still allow the legitimate user access when they come to make their last minute bid?

    If not this then what about using a login name which is different then the displayed account name? This way the login name is not available to people viewing a particular account's public details for their use in a DoS. I know this is an added step of complication but may be necessary to eliminate bad side effects.

    • More reason to use sniping
      software. Hide yourself.
    • by wdr1 ( 31310 ) <wdr1@p[ ]x.com ['obo' in gap]> on Monday May 20, 2002 @04:26PM (#3553300) Homepage Journal
      I realize how ridiculously easy it is to get a new IP address on a dialup system or in a facility where someone has access to many addresses but wouldn't a simple IP block after so many attempts help discourage the casual DoS but still allow the legitimate user access when they come to make their last minute bid?

      There are a lot of solutions that seem great at first, but encounter difficulties once you try to execute them. In this instance, you're totally forgetting about a couple of factors.

      1) Scalability - how do keep this IP list? How do you search it quickly? How do store the data? Expire it? Compute your run time for values of N > 100,000,000. Does it still work?

      2) Proxy servers & routers/ip masquerading. While a lot of slashdotter's don't live behind them, a lot of Internet users, including those using very popular providers, such as AOL, do. If you block based upon IP, you still allow AOL users to block one other. A step up from nothing, perhaps, but far from a complete solution.

      There's probably more, but those are two off the top of my head.

      -Bill
      • 1) Scalability - how do keep this IP list? How do you search it quickly? How do store the data? Expire it? Compute your run time for values of N > 100,000,000. Does it still work?

        I would imagine if you're dealing with an authentication system the size of Yahoo's that you're already dealing with large data sets that need searched quickly. IP address and number of failures from taht address could simply be an additional token checked when the authentication occurs.

        You're right tho, even the simplest solutions would require an elaborate implementation, both in terms of coding it in efficiently and equipment to supply the data quickly.

        2) Proxy servers & routers/ip masquerading. While a lot of slashdotter's don't live behind them, a lot of Internet users, including those using very popular providers, such as AOL, do. If you block based upon IP, you still allow AOL users to block one other. A step up from nothing, perhaps, but far from a complete solution.

        This is a complicated problem... Does the proxy include some sort of unique identifier in its request? Filtering based on that, however, would introduce the same type of horsepower problems you mention... I am split, however, on simply saying that the losers should get a better ISP but at the same time I like proxies because they typically make a network more efficient. AGH!

  • I have decided to let my yahoo mailbox fill with the spam that they allow. I figure that if they have to pay for the space, storage, and backup of spam for all these accounts, they will eventually figure out that they need to do something.

    I only use the account for testing mail from the *outside* world. If they shutoff that account, I will get one from somewhere else. God, I may even break down and open an account on Hotmail...

    Quick, help, I may be slipping into the clutches of the M$ beast....

    And now for something completely different...
    • Bizarre - I've had a Yahoo mail account for a couple of years which I use only for forwarding work mail so I can pick it up with my WAP phone and I haven't had a single piece of spam to the account. It does have a pretty obfuscated username (it's not something like dude666 it's more like random letters).

      I sometimes wonder whether some people get spam on such services because their username is easily "guessable" by a spambot. I mean something like dude666 is going to be much easier to guess than hwklnmd!
  • Trolls and Karma Whores enjoy
    stories of Yahoo
  • In 1998, we had started a company with the sole purpose of proving who and who is not a robot on line. We developed a range of techniques for detecting bots and stopping spammers -- images, rate limits, statistical techniques, etc.

    The two most important techniques were what we called the "Visual Turing Test" and a reapplication of a cypherpunk scheme called HashCash.

    The Visual Turing Test is widely used today, it's the image generated with a code that you have to type in. Our technique started with that, but went much further to defeat OCRs by including AI-level questions, such as displaying an image with a dog, a cat, and a horse, with instructions in the image that say "click on the one that is not a house hold pet."

    Back then, we ran a free webmail service for people, without adds, using these techniques to stop email spam.

    We were a very poor start up, working over a year with no pay. We went to Yahoo and had a meeting with their engineers and biz-dev people, under a *nondisclosure agreement*, we demoed all this anti-spam, anti-fraud technology. We were looking to sell them the scalable image generation server software we wrote, statistical analysis software, and our services, and potentially our patent on these techniques.

    Yahoo basically said "not interested" after several meetings, and one yahoo engineer basically said "We could implement this all myself, why do we need you?" We never heard from yahoo again, didn't get any more meetings. But magically, about a year later, we noticed yahoo using our techniques.

    Our company was eventually bought by one of those "pay to watch ads" companies, because they had massive fraud of people installing fake clients, and signing up for hundreds of accounts. Unlike Yahoo's fraud problem, these companies were paying out tens of millions of dollars in cash to people who were signing up bogus accounts.

    But it still doesn't take away from the fact that Yahoo is a dishonest shark. If it wasn't for the fact that I am morally opposed to using software patents against people (only had one to make our biz plan look good for investors), I would have sued them.

    Word to the wise. Don't present your ideas to yahoo as a small startup and expect they will abide by an NDA.

    • by Anonymous Coward on Monday May 20, 2002 @04:34PM (#3553366)
      Your claims are pretty slanderous, and you don't have much to back them up.

      For one, it looks like Yahoo did not even implement their own system. If you look right below the word prompt, you can see they're basically using Captcha [captcha.net] developed at Carnegie Mellon [cmu.edu].

      Are you saying CMU stole for you as well?

      Is it possible that others came up with similar, if not better, systems, and they used them instead?

    • >Don't present your ideas to yahoo as a small startup and expect they will abide by an NDA.

      You need to have filed a patent application before you talk to Yahoo. That's what patents are for. But I forgot, you people understand patents very well, and hate them.
  • by Erasmus Darwin ( 183180 ) on Monday May 20, 2002 @03:49PM (#3552992)
    It's a shame his reverse authentication idea will never take off. I've actually wished there were something already available along these lines. As it currently stands, email addresses are a dime a dozen, IP addresses can change every few minutes (for dialup and DSL users, at least), and proxies allow a user to avoid even a broad IP range block.

    So it would be a great boon to web services if there were a way to somehow have a way of confirming that a person hasn't already signed up for a service. It'd allow many boards to weed-out their troll population while maintaining an open sign-up. On one forum I was on, the problem was so bad that registration was completely closed then later moved to a pay-only model.

    The problem is that I can't see any way to do it without compromising the identities of the people. For example, I don't see a problem with Slashdot knowing that 'Erasmus Darwin' is my only Slashdot account, but I don't want to create a system where they could theoretically share records with another entity and use that to determine my identity there. Perhaps the identity token I provide to Slashdot could be some sort of one-way hash of my identity combined with '@slashdot.org', thereby limiting it to a single area.

    One downside of this system is that a government-type institution with a search warrant could use my secret identity information to reproduce my Slashdot token and verify my identity. I don't see any way to prevent the identification from somehow serving to find-out who I am. Still, that theoretically pushes the identification process off to a similar level of difficulty to tracing the user's IP (i.e. Slashdot couldn't do it on its own). Thus, if we pretend that no one uses anonymizing web proxies, it's the same level of anonymity.

    Also, there'd be a problem of issuing the secret identity keys. Presumably, this would be handled by the companies that already do encryption/security certificates. That means there'd be a cost associated with such keys, which would turn away a number of people. If only a small percentage of people fork over the $XX/year for a personal identity certificate, most sites won't be able to require their use for signup. Furthermore, it'd be difficult for the issuing agency to verify the uniqueness of each request, especially when we consider that this would have an international audience. I also wouldn't be surprised if some of the countries that have whored out their ccTLDs decided to also start selling their equivilent of SSNs to people interested in extra identities.

    Finally, there'd be the issue of identity theft. Having a single, computer-based identity key would be a very tempting target for various malicious programs. If I were an evil spammer type and such an identity system were in place, I'd definitely try and steal as many identities as possible for sign up use.

  • So he's considering changing the registration test to a simple arithmetic problem. It won't stop the mass registrations, but he might be able to get the abusers to perform distributed computing tasks for him.


    I wouldn't get my hopes up. If the calculation he needs is really complex, he should get himself a pocket calculator. I suspect that would be one hell of a lot faster.

    Besides, I wouldn't want a bunch of pr0n hounds working out the reentry trajectory of the next-gen space shuttle.

  • obfustacated code (Score:2, Interesting)

    by Jeremy Erwin ( 2054 )
    Sometimes, it's much easier to use information if it's not tied down to a browser page-- perl programmers have been parsing web pages for years. Various versions of Excel can do this as well, importing data from Yahoo! Finance 's stock ticker directly into a spreadsheet. Sherlock (for MacOS) parses search engine results. BioPerl parses NCBI webpages (among others) into sequence data...

    Obfuscated code makes this type of activity less useful. The trouble is that most of the services are tied to an archaic, and annoying advertising based model. Sherlock gets around this problem by actually parsing the ads and displaying them to a mac user. But most clients are built not to avoid ads so much as increasing the usability of the data. For some things, web browser interfaces leave a lot to be desired.

1 + 1 = 3, for large values of 1.

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