NULL Pointer Exploit Excites Researchers 327
Da Massive writes "Mark Dowd's paper "Application-Specific Attacks: Leveraging the ActionScript Virtual Machine" has alarmed researchers. It points out techniques that promise to open up a class of exploits and vulnerability research previously thought to be prohibitively difficult. Already, the small but growing group of Information Security experts who have had the chance to read and digest the contents of the paper are expressing an excited concern depending on how they are interpreting it. While the Flash vulnerability described in the paper[PDF] has been patched by Adobe, the presentation of a reliable exploit for NULL pointer dereferencing has the researchers who have read the paper fascinated. Thomas Ptacek has an explanation of Dowd's work, and Nathan McFeters at ZDNet is 'stunned by the technical details.'"
The crux of the exploit: (Score:5, Informative)
To this address, controlled by attackers via wild offset, Flash writes a value that is also controlled by the attacker. This is the write32 pattern: a vulnerability that gives the attacker the means to set any one value in memory to a value of their choosing. Game over.
The exploit doesn't actually get to offset an arbitrary number of bytes from 0. A complicated set of conditions constrains the address it writes to and the value it gives it.
The the actual write occurs via a structure offset. Flash is hardcoded to translate your offset into another number. Working offsets, as it turns out, will be greater than 0x80000000, and will be evenly divisible by 12 after 4 is added to them. Note: I thought I was hardcore when I wrote shellcode with no lowercase letters for the IMAP vulnerability in the '90s.
That's not all. The value that Flash will write to the wild pointer isn't totally controlled by the attacker either. It's cast up from a 16 bit integer to a 32 bit integer, and has another variable subtracted to it. This is the point in the report that I started giggling uncontrollably, embarassing myself at the coffee shop...
To wit: his exploit must (because he's messing with us) corrupt the Flash runtime, rewrite it to execute his trojan, and leave it running steady as if nothing had happened. Meaning:
--His modification to the verifier can't break existing instructions. --His bytecode has to swap values into the stack instead of clobbering them directly. --Portions of his shellcode have to run as both Flash bytecode and an X86 first-stage shellcode boot.
Two fun details:
First, even though IE and Firefox use different Flash builds, the addressing inside them is compatible. The exploit works in both places.
Second, Flash isn't compiled with ASLR. So the attack works on Vista.
Mass casualty. Go Flash!"
Comment removed (Score:5, Informative)
Always check your return values! (Score:3, Informative)
The fact that Flash is doing all of these bytecode things also of course makes it more interesting. The first article linked seems to suggest that that makes the exploit really difficult (probably true), but it sounds like it also made it... well... possible.
Comment removed (Score:4, Informative)
Re:Big deal (Score:5, Informative)
not boring (Score:1, Informative)
Re:boring? (Score:5, Informative)
Why Java? (Score:2, Informative)
Comment removed (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Binary blobs (Score:4, Informative)
Actually, its just a major PITA, period.
Flash isn't any more secure on windows.
And there's no 64-bit version for windows either.
Windows x64 even ships with a proper 64-bit Internet Explorer 7, but it doesn't support flash. So to view flash in Windows x64, just like on Linux x64 you need to use a 32-bit web browser. Pretty sad.
And it goes without saying the a 64-bit build of Firefox (Minefield) doesn't work with flash on Windows x64 either.
Re:The crux of the exploit: (Score:3, Informative)
And, oh yes, WTF!!OMG!! - '...should be banned...'. Yeah, ban the filthy programming languages that don't babysit the programmer. While we are at it lets ban corners, very dangerous.
Re:flashblock ftw! (Score:5, Informative)
Flashblock does not prevent flash running.
It removes existing flash from the DOM AFTER it has already been inserted and sometimes the initialization of the flash starts before it is replaced by the clicker.
Granted, most of the time it is removed before the ping time of the destination server with the SWF, but not always.
(Notice on a very slow page with lots of html you may see flash for a couple of seconds).
The only way to allow flashblock to block in a sane manner would be to replace the actual Flash binary with our own binary clicker that only calls the original adobe flash binary after clicking to view.
Everything else is a hack.
Re:The crux of the exploit: (Score:2, Informative)
Re:The crux of the exploit: (Score:2, Informative)
If you think Flash sucks now, wait until it is written in 100% Java.
Because underneath it all, the computer runs its native instructions. Period. The GP is a fucking moron if he thinks "throwing an exception" is a cure-all for insecure code. One guy develops a complicated NULL-pointer exploit that's valid in ONE virtual machine, and the GP reflexively supports banning C and C++.
Probably because he's too stupid to code properly without having some virtual machine interpreter holding his dick.
If you don't understand the consequences of the code you write, you're incompetent and in over your head. Banning specific languages won't improve your comprehension.
Re:fubar (Score:5, Informative)
If you want to know something about the config, you type about:config and get to the super duper advanced settings page.
Re:Big deal (Score:5, Informative)
solves the problems on Ubuntu boxes as of this moment, so someone at Ubuntu is paying attention. Don't know about Debian, because I don't run Flash on any of my Debian machines.
Re:fubar (Score:3, Informative)
On mine, I see this:
Shockwave Flash
File name: NPSWF32.dll
Shockwave Flash 9.0 r47
Re:So... 0x8000000 is salt? (Score:4, Informative)
It's not a salt, it's just an artifact of how the Flash VM operates. There's a year-old post on Dowd's blog with a much simpler example of the same class of vulnerability: http://taossa.com/index.php/2007/04/15/bored-games/ [taossa.com]
Basically, the vulnerability occurs when you can write to an arbitrary offset from NULL. This is probably a common enough mistake that no one has been looking for because NULL derefs are usually just a crash bug. What Dowd has shown is that with a little application knowledge, and control of the deref value, you can make this type of bug into a perfectly reliable exploit that is unaffected by application hardening like stack canaries and heap checking.
Re:hmm. (Score:3, Informative)
Re:flashblock ftw! (Score:4, Informative)
You are right, and I pointed that out at first, it doesnt happen most of the time, but it can occur.
go read the source.
http://www.mozdev.org/source/browse/flashblock/source/content/flashblock/flashblock.xml?rev=1.34;content-type=text%2Fplain;sortby=date [mozdev.org]
Look for the settimeout values which indicate you want a callback event raising after a specified period.
The period is set to 0, but as with all callbacks, I believe it does not run instantly.
(This code used to fail if you just call the flashblockShowPlaceholder() function directly because the actual DOM is not completely initialized)
Most of the time the flash will be blocked instantly, but if other threaded operations are ongoing and the page load is not simple then the flash actually gets time to run.
(If its totally changed and is really secure I will be very pleasantly surprised, but from the looks of things it hasn't yet).
Re:Binary blobs (Score:2, Informative)
Re:The crux of the exploit: (Score:5, Informative)
Hold on a minute there, Captain Ivory Tower. Perhaps *your* C++ compiler does that. Mine (VC++, probably the most used compiler on the planet) does not.
With VC++6 it returns NULL. With newer versions it *sometimes* will throw an exception, but it depends on which libraries the linker happened to pull in first. See this link [microsoft.com] for more information.
Re:flashblock ftw! (Score:1, Informative)
Re:The crux of the exploit: (Score:1, Informative)
This statement is simply false. Java is written in C/C++ and has had a number of memory corruption vulnerabilities identified in it. Further, all those Java objects are passed around as references, so I certainly wouldn't discount someone finding an exploitable NULL pointer dereference.
I do agree that Java makes such bugs a lot less likely, because they can occur in only the platform and JNI modules. However, it does not make you immune.
Re:fubar (Score:2, Informative)
Re:The crux of the exploit: (Score:2, Informative)
If you know java/JVM like he exploited flash bytecode, you can exploint null derefeneces just like he did with flash in java.
JIT, with all kind of crazy optimizations will make it only worse.
The problem is that you can break out the virtual machine(/application) if you knwo it well enough.
Even virtualisation will not fix this. Look at the vmware 1.05 release notes and you see that there was a exploit where the client could write in the ENTIRE host file system.
Re:The crux of the exploit: (Score:3, Informative)
The first C compilers were written in assembly. What's GCC written in? C. More interestingly, what's Gnat (GNU Ada) written in? That's right. Ada.
How's that you ask? It's the very bootstrapping process you refer to.
As long as you can compile to machine code, there's no reason you ever need to write it. If you have a new machine, just make a cross-compiler in a high level language. Sure you need to have a native code generator at some level to createe the lowest level code that runs on the new machine, but that native code can be generated from as high a level language as you like once you have a sufficient software stack.
Of course, such bootstrapping has its own problems. [bell-labs.com]
Re:The crux of the exploit: (Score:3, Informative)
These get MUCH less rare when you crank up the warning and optimization levels. For example, the following idiom generates a warning in recent GCC versions if you turn -Wstrict-overflow on:
This tends to generate the following warning:
warning: assuming signed overflow does not occur when simplifying conditional to constant
*sigh*