SkiifGeek writes "Race to Zero, a sideline competition being set up at this year's DefCon, already has some Antivirus vendors steaming over the objectives of the contest. They are upset because it is essentially a polymorphism exercise. Entrants are given a set of malware samples which they must then modify to pass through a battery of antivirus scanners without detection while still carrying a viable payload. Even if competitors ignore the published vulnerabilities and weaknesses affecting antivirus vendors, the competition should turn up some interesting results. It may provide technical insight and concepts for further research as similar competitions have done in the past."
Having a highly efficient swiss cheese-patching process is still not a mark of good security. Don't interpret that as saying that security is not a process, but the value of doing a one-time job to make a good security design should also not be underestimated. In fact, I think many companies would do well to divert a little more resources to just that...
By having some top-notch creative talent (never mind which color hat they're wearing) take a stab at creating new styles of malware under controlled conditions, they're giving the antivirus vendors a great opportunity to study these creations -- and therefore to be better able to protect against them.
Heck, if I were Symantec, McAffee et al -- I'd take the opportunity to try to *recruit* programmers who had interesting entries in the contest! (Better to have them working for you, right?)
"The antivirus vendors are in business to make money. Every one of these issues they have to deal with equates to lost money."
Exactly right, if you don't count that you have it backwards. Lets start with the edge case 0. If there are Zero viruses, there is no need for the AV software. In fact, within reason the more viruses out there, the more money they make! If viruses are not even a blip on the radar when I do my security landscape evaluation, then the AV companies make no money because I would not purchase their product. If there are many viruses, then an AV company can sit back and wait for others (security folks, e.g.) to justify the purchase of my product. I don't even need a sales force. True, it cost me more to have in house peons gather virus signatures and add them to my database, or add algorithms to my AV tools, but since I don't have to pay nearly as much for a sales force more viruses equals greater profits.
I'm sure referencing a wacko supply-sider will make someone mad, but I bet the profit to virus count relationship follows something like the Laffer curve, where at some point malware becomes so pervasive that people at least stop running anything that doesn't come in a box from Walmart and maybe even stop using computers altogether, so they don't need protection anymore.
They dont need actually viruses and malware, they just need people (and businesses) to be afraid of them enough to consider them treat.
All you have to give to people is feeling of security and to make them think that you can shield them from any nasty stuff they might have heard on TV. And people are easily scared because they in general know little about computers.
People are scared and they get AVs (or careless and they wouldnt get AV even if there was billion of virii), so you fight for market share rather than install.
And your only feature you are ging to sell to those people is confidence of unpenetrable shield.
So yeah, AV companies do want perception of threat high and actually threat low. Thats when they make most money.
Every reall threat costs them money, Every imaginary threat makes them money.
not really. Once the AV company has enough viruses in the wild to persuade you to buy their product, all the viruses past that point is just a costly nuisance to them.
Writing software is an investment. You put money in, you get money back. This contest DOES require them to put more money in, but they will get more money BACK. It's "forced investment". Now if you'd rather write a piece of software and then spend the next 6 years merely putting out new-os-compatibility updates, (and how many of those have we seen? many!) you will fall behind, and no one will care about upgrading to version 7 because there's nothing in 7 that their version 5 can't already do, and your
Because polymorphism is considerably easier to implement than it is to circumvent (if it's even possible at all).
Essentially, this punches a huge hole in the security model of Norton and McAfee's product lines, rendering them completely ineffective against this sort of threat.
Personally, I've always found it remarkable that they've managed to hold on as long as they have, given just how deeply flawed the very notion of an Antivirus is.
As long as you've got a decently secure operating system, nothing more than a rudimentary antivirus should be necessary.
Sorry, the OS doesn't really make any difference (assuming you have a firewall - which all current operating systems do - to protect against buffer overflows found on inbound ports). What makes the difference is secure users.
I don't care how secure your OS is, if users are going to click on SomeFamousPersonNaked.exe, then they are going to eventually get owned - "secure" OS or not. We've all heard the "Linux doesn't get attacked much because it has an insignificant market share" and sort of argued around it - maybe the real one is "Linux doesn't get attacked much because the average Linux user knows enough to not click on ridiculous shit that gets emailed to them."
I run both Windows and Linux and the only time I have had a AV product tell me "oh noes, there is a virus" is when I have been manually TRYING to infect a system in order to reverse engineer what the damn thing does (in order to create cleanup packages for work). These are in non-networked VM's where we also re-image the host afterwards. But really - a secure USER is what we need. The OS won't make all that much difference compared to the user.
I don't care how secure your OS is, if users are going to click on SomeFamousPersonNaked.exe , then they are going to eventually get owned - "secure" OS or not. We've all heard the "Linux doesn't get attacked much because it has an insignificant market share" and sort of argued around it - maybe the real one is "Linux doesn't get attacked much because the average Linux user knows enough to not click on ridiculous shit that gets emailed to them."
No. Linux and MacOS do not get attacked, because normal users don't run with the sort of privileges that would allow the virus (or trojan as in your example) to do very much damage or replicate itself.
Similarly, replication of such a virus becomes even more difficult, as E-mail clients and servers both generally tend to block attachments containing executables...
Sure, there are mechanisms for it to happen, but trojans generally don't spread very fast or very far. A true "virus" typically utilizes an OS e
I was going to moderate, but I can't let this one slide.
normal users don't run with the sort of privileges that would allow the virus (or trojan as in your example) to do very much damage or replicate itself.
A normal user has access to the network and a home directory. How is that not enough for a virus?
Sure, it can't burn itself into the registry or equivalent, but it sure as hell can replicate itself. Hell, it can even cause a lot of headaches when you're lazy like me and have a whole drive mounted in/home/jurily/stuff with full write access.
Trojans are a different beast, of course, as they rely on the OS more heavily.
I agree completely. User permissions are sufficient to run cronjobs, send spam, and (often) steal sensitive information. User permissions are not enough to keylog, but I'm sure a firefox profile directory is often worth as much as a keylogging session.
Linux and MacOS do not get attacked, because normal users don't run with the sort of privileges that would allow the virus (or trojan as in your example) to do very much damage or replicate itself.
WTF? Any program I run has +rw access to ~ (can start itself from.profile, do arbitrary damage to all the files I actually care about, and steal passwords and the like) and the ability to connect(2) to random parts of the internet (ability to replicate, send passwords, and fetch ads). No privileges beyond this are needed to cause trouble.
The real reason is probably more to do with the size and average competency of the userbase.
Exactly. A virus for Linux at this point in time probably doesn't stand a snowball's chance in hell on the average Linux system because Linux users are smarter than the average Windows user. (I am generalizing and using a more relative version of smarter here.) That, coupled with the fact there are less than a hundredLinux viruses and a small user base, a Linux virus is not much of a threat... FOR NOW.
But what happens when we actually DO accomplish full-on Linux on the desktop? What happens if, hypotheti
No there is need. Under Linux a non privileged software has only access to high-level network access, such as opening a regular connection. There's no low-level access to network (crafting the data packets as wished) for non privileged software.
Thus a potential running virus, *COULD* connect to its C&C if it receives its orders from an IRC channel. But the virus won't be able to create spoofed packets (used for sophisticated bounces and DDOS) or specially crafted packets to exploit flaws on the target system. Whereas under Windows, non-privileged applications CAN craft packets, and users run as administrators anyway.
A non privileged process CAN download Ads from the internet, but it will have a harder time injecting them into the browser window. An admin-privileged process in Windows could hijack the network stack and rewrite HTML on the fly inserting pop-ups and ads. Under a non-privileged account in Linux, it can't. The virus will need instead to be able to rewrite the configuration of all gazillion of browser that exist in Linux, either injecting a spyware plugin or rerouting the traffic through a proxy process spawned by the virus. Anyway, the absence of a single point of attack, and the lack of monoculture make Linux a more complicated target.
Also, few user-friendly type distros (Ubuntu and the like) come with a sendmail (or equivalent) configured out-of-the-box for internet message delivery. Usually it's only configured to deliver alerts to the local user account. A potential operational Spam bot would either have to send directly the spam to the internet and both hope that the network isn't configured to reject email not going out through the SMTP server and hope that the infected machine doesn't sit on a dynamic IP which will automatically get discarded on the receiving machine. Or the potential Spam Bot will need additional complexity to retrieve the user's SMTP configuration, which will be difficult, both because there's a gazillion of different mail clients under linux, and both because several of them password-encrypt the credential (Thunderbird can do it and all KDE software store their passwords in KWallet which is masterpassword-encrypted by default). This is security by diversity, and why it's good to avoid monocultures. This is opposed to Windows, where most users have outlook express, which lacks the ability to encrypt the credentials.
Under Linux, it takes several step to execute code downloaded from a browser, as a reference, see the HOWTOs about downloading the latest GPU drivers straigth from the constructor site instead of using whatever is the regular package management/delivery mechanism used by the distro (you have to manually chmod it "executable". Clicking on it usually opens an editor). And that's neglecting that it is possible to "noexec" the whole home, in which case it's not even possible to *run* code from ~. So even if he wanted to, a linux user can't just click on "NataliePortmanNaked.sh" and execute it (unless its a regular package inside Synaptic or YaST, of course) whereas a Windows user can click on "PetrifiedWithHotGrits.exe".
Also, downloading software from random websites isn't as common in Linux as in Windows. Mostly only geeks download software for Linux and usually they download it in (controllable) source form, where anomalies could more easily get spotted. The regular user will employ the package management system for the distro to get the needed package from the regular repository instead, as because of the diversity of Linux distros, he'll need a custom compiled packagee for the present distro, ie.: Windows wanting kitten-powered screensaver will google around to find a page proposing some spyware infested screensaver. Anyone can download, but you *need* to be computer-literate and careful about your source to *avoid* getting undesired stuff.
The Linux users will browser Synaptic and download the package "omg-lol-ponie
That is assuming that the user is completely stupid, OTOH if you click dancingpigs.exe and get prompted to give your root password or even just accept/deny, most users will click cancel (if they dont you haven't explained sudo well enough). So then it comes down to which OS has the least privilege escalation attacks.
Could a virus sit in waiting, and do nothing that a non-priviledged user wouldn't be able to do, and then avoid any user prompts until it detects that another sudo prompt for a different application has been fired. And then fire something right after that one is passed to cause another prompt. The user would probably just think it's for the other program they just allowed, and let the virus do it's thing. Most prompts just give the app access to whatever they want as soon as you give it permission, and h
You're right that it's about secure users, but it's much easier to be a secure user on Linux, precisely because you would never download foo.exe -- or foo.sh, or whatever. For the most part, you get things through your package manager, or not at all.
As such, it is not particularly easy to download and run SomeFamousPersonNaked.bin -- you have to download it to somewhere, then you have to change its permissions, and then you have to run it -- and even then, they still don't have root.
However, for a very long time, an antivirus actually made some sort of sense on Windows, because you would have exploits from visiting a webpage or reading an email. You actually had a situation where the most security-conscious users would never use the Preview Pane, so that they could delete suspicious emails without looking at them. In that particular kind of insane world, it makes sense to have antivirus -- and that is precisely why antivirus seems so laughable now.
We've all heard the "Linux doesn't get attacked much because it has an insignificant market share" and sort of argued around it - maybe the real one is "Linux doesn't get attacked much because the average Linux user knows enough to not click on ridiculous shit that gets emailed to them."
Which would put a very low upper limit on Linux's market share. The way Linux saves the noobs is that you don't do it in the first place, you go to add/remove programs and find the software you want there. The way Linux saves the warez-wannabes is that Linux doesn't need cracks. I'm sure that if Linux became more mainstream with more commercial software, you could have trusted shops that you could add in the same way as repositories. Think something like tucows, cnet, snapfiles etc. only for Linux. Basicly
Given, I haven't actually tried, but it doesn't seem like it would be that hard to implement.
If you can just break your code into several hundred or thousand blocks of nonthreatening code, then all you need is a way to randomize their placement in the binary. It doesn't seem THAT difficult. You could even have it relink itself into a new binary every time it is run.
You would probably need to separate the original programming from the randomization for debugging reasons. In other words you would probab
Agreed. If they think this is a bad idea does that mean they don't do it in house? If so, that is very surprising and I would expect any and all anti-virus companies to not only test their software but also actively try to break it. Otherwise their stance must be 'wait and see' and fix bugs as the come up. Unfortunately these bugs can have severe consequences with this type of software, which can (and probably will) lead to their customers losing millions, possibly more, in damages from viruses that sli
By having some top-notch creative talent (never mind which color hat they're wearing) take a stab at creating new styles of malware under controlled conditions, they're giving the antivirus vendors a great opportunity to study these creations -- and therefore to be better able to protect against them.
But what if what the antivirus vendors need is not time to study but time to come up with cures?
I've worked on plenty of software where the problem was well-understood, but you could be so pestered
to death by people trying to tell you there was a problem that you had no time left to work on a cure.
I don't follow this community closely, but speaking from general knowledge of software projects over
several decades...
It seems likely that these competitions do not teach the antivirus vendors what they don't know.
It probably creates a firedrill internally where a long-range effort to do a substantive upgrade
that would do what people wish for is side-tracked by a short-term need to make sure that people's
machines are not broken into by a new stupid trick today, thanks to additional resources provided by
well-meaning but "mal-informed" volunteers.
Resources are always in short supply in companies, and there's a constant need to triage between short-term
and long-term planning. Events like this increase the stress on short-term projects, causing them to
draw precious resources away from long-term projects.
The claim that this provides valuable data to the vendors sounds like spin created by malware vendors
who are chuckling all the way to the bank because they get free help from a community
of people who I suspect don't realize the harm they are doing.
What they should be having is competitive
events to come up with cool public-domain techniques for recognizing and stopping such malware in the general cases, thus reducing short-term strain on anti-virus vendors.
If passed into law (this bill already has passed the house twice but never has cleared the Senate), I-SPY would make it a criminal offense punishable by fines and/or up to five years in prison for "intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, or exceed[ing] authorized access to a protected computer, by causing a computer program or code to be copied onto the protected computer, and intentionally us[ing] that program or code in furtherance of another Federal criminal offense." Similar activity that is designed to defraud or injure a person or cause damage to a protected computer, but is not conducted in furtherance of another Federal offense, subjects the perpetrator to a fine and/or up to two years in prison.
I'm fairly sure viruses would fall under at least the bold part. I have no idea how much (if at all) this is a result of lobbying by antivirus vendors.
What would happen if Ralph got involved in the computer antivirus field?
lets translate FTFA
"It will do more harm than good to our company," said Paul Ferguson, a researcher with antivirus vendor TrendMicro. "Responsible disclosure is one thing, but now actually encouraging people to do this (as if the NSA isn't already doing so), as a contest is a little over the top.When really smart people start working on malicious software, we won't be able to keep up"
Bold edits added by me.
How about this slogan "Unsafe with any version!"
I think they are afraid that regular joe end users are about to find out that programs meant to protect your pc are always an after the fact effort which leaves you vulnerable until you update and that there is no way to keep you safe from a zero-day facebook exploit. Even the government websites can be malicious until patched/fixed.
And soon, the conclusion will be... uh, why pay for that. Spybot search and destroy is free, and ClamAV is free. I can just give them a one time donation and get just as good of protection... hmmmm These pricey programs really can't do all that much.
Wow, it would be such a shame if joe bloggs end user found out the truth. tisk tisk
I fail to see how the statement "And soon, the conclusion will be... uh, why pay for that. Spybot search and destroy is free, and ClamAV is free. I can just give them a one time donation and get just as good of protection..." is not true?
Solution: Update to version 0.93.
The vulnerabilities are reported in versions prior to 0.92.1.
Solution: Update to version 0.92.1.
This is exactly what I was saying, and is true of all antivirus software. If you don't stay updated, you are vulnerable. The POINT was why pay so much for it?
If this is being run like the hacking laptops thing recently, then what's the big deal? So long as the vulnerabilities are only disclosed to *all* AV vendors in private afterwards...
The AV vendors who are complaining are more afraid of *other* vendors than xploits... If anything found here goes to all then it levels the playing field open source style...
The fear they have is that people will realize how useless anti-virus software really is. If there are simple techniques to get around any anti-virus software, and the whole world knows it, then there's not much point in paying to run some AV software that just slows down your computer, is there? Already we know that AV software is useless against 0-day exploits, and if your vendor is making reasonably timed updates, your AV software only has nominal value anyway.
Bypassing current antivirus process is almost trivial. Just change a few lines and the signature based antivirus will not detect your virus. Now, create a process that automatically changes the few lines in a random order, but create this process as a random evolving like the virus and payload itself. Random jumps (with next payload at good place) with random junk in between should be sufficient to bypass heuristics (who said goto was dead:)). Then you've just killed the whole antivirus industry as we know today.
Wow... You would have been considered really clever in the virus world... about fifteen years ago.
Guess what: Your invention has already been created. AF companies have countered with "heuristic" or "behavioral" virus detection. The purpose of this exercise is to game not just the signatures, but the heuristics as well.
I wonder if the only vendors upset, are the ones that are used to vet the entries... Anyone have data? At the end of the contest, all their competitors will be able to know just how badly they did against the polymorphic techniques the entrants used. I imagine that would upset the PR people at those companies. As usual, the technical merit of such a competition is NOT the driving force for any discussion, just money.
The present crop of virus scanners are a really dumb idea, since they don't provide any real protection. Consequently I am all for this kind of competition. Hopefully it will force Microsoft and the AV parasites to create a proper security solution for the MS crapware.
Well, the idea of Default Deny makes perfect sense to me. Tell the OS which programs are allowed to run, and notify me if something I have not explicitly allowed tries to execute, wherein I can take the opportunity to allow it or not. I run a total of a couple dozen programs, grand total, so it wouldn't be hard to get a system up and running after a new install. Since you seem to be a security expert in your own right, beyond anything Marcus have ever done, feel free to explain why this basic idea will not w
Malware=problem, antivirus/security products are part of the solution. But what if you hit a problem that have no (practical) solution? What if next generation of malware using that technique make very hard/impossible to deal with them? Once you reach the point that you cant tell when something is even potentially malware, all are in trouble.
Probably would be more clear if they were investigating with genetics/biological malware instead of computer one.
But it *does* have a solution: don't give all your apps full access to ~ . Sandbox everything, and let programs fork and shrink their own sandboxes if they want to. The only part of your web browser that needs arbitrary filesystem access are the save/open dialogs, but there's no way to forbid other filesystem access outside of your profile directory. Maybe if you could do, say, "SaveDialogGenerator foo = new SaveDialogGenerator(System.Filesystem); System.Filesystem = null;" or similar, but no....
But what if you hit a problem that have no (practical) solution?
All problems have solutions and practicality becomes relative to how much you want to stay virus free.
Imagine a scenario like you mentioned in which there was no known solution, no patch forthcoming from MS or AV vendors, and internet connectivity meant you would be infected.
Then disconnecting your Windows computer from the net and using another operating system might be practical even if it means you have to give up productivity.
...that Michelle Madigan would love to get an undercover report of all the big mean hackers making new viruses in Las Vegas. Too bad she was busted last time she tried to spy on Defcon.
The vendors reply is just classic. It's essentially an admission that their products don't work. The whole AV industry is built on trying to idenitify existing viruses, and have a signature for them.
Of course, if you find the virus out in the wild and identify it, you've already failed for a lot of people. (but I'm sure they don't like to talk about that).
This is like a safe manufacturer objecting to someone actually trying to break open a safe like a real criminal would. "What! You used a crowbar and liquid nitrogen?! You're just letting the criminals know more about cold+crowbar usage!!! You should know OUR safes protect against sledgehammers VERY well."
Get real AV vendors. Everyone already knows you can't stand up to new viruses, and only protect against the known ones. People still buy your damn software anyway, because it's better than nothing.
I think AV vendors would rather be in the business of selling a placebo than selling a cure.
What I fear personally is recombination, where malware writers start setting up protocols for automatically and randomly exchanging code/modules with other malware without need for human intervention. That's where I feel the next explosion could come from - both in the variety of malware and the speed at which new innovations propagate across various strains. The only thing holding it back would seem to be the pr
By Rice's theorem, proving any non-trivial property of a program is equivalent to the halting problem. Hence AV detection is an ultimately losing battle.
But then, there is no need to be able to prove 100% that the software is harmful. The simple rule could be: If you cannot proof that it isn't harmful, it's a security risk. Of course for that rule to be useful, the class of programs where you can prove it has to be large enough to allow for any useful behaviour. This certainly is hard, and maybe it's not achievable, but I don't know of any proof for that.
Note that the halting problem does not say that you cannot write a program which can tell for some algo
Oh no! (Score:5, Insightful)
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Why should this upset them? (Score:5, Insightful)
Heck, if I were Symantec, McAffee et al -- I'd take the opportunity to try to *recruit* programmers who had interesting entries in the contest! (Better to have them working for you, right?)
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They dont need actually viruses and malware, they just need people (and businesses) to be afraid of them enough to consider them treat.
All you have to give to people is feeling of security and to make them think that you can shield them from any nasty stuff they might have heard on TV. And people are easily scared because they in general know little about computers.
People are scared and they get AVs (or careless and they wouldnt get AV even if there was billion of virii), so you fight for market share rather than install.
And your only feature you are ging to sell to those people is confidence of unpenetrable shield.
So yeah, AV companies do want perception of threat high and actually threat low. Thats when they make most money.
Every reall threat costs them money, Every imaginary threat makes them money.
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Essentially, this punches a huge hole in the security model of Norton and McAfee's product lines, rendering them completely ineffective against this sort of threat.
Personally, I've always found it remarkable that they've managed to hold on as long as they have, given just how deeply flawed the very notion of an Antivirus is.
As long as you've got a decently secure operating system, nothing more than a rudimentary antivirus should be necessary.
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Re:Why should this upset them? (Score:5, Insightful)
I don't care how secure your OS is, if users are going to click on SomeFamousPersonNaked.exe , then they are going to eventually get owned - "secure" OS or not. We've all heard the "Linux doesn't get attacked much because it has an insignificant market share" and sort of argued around it - maybe the real one is "Linux doesn't get attacked much because the average Linux user knows enough to not click on ridiculous shit that gets emailed to them."
I run both Windows and Linux and the only time I have had a AV product tell me "oh noes, there is a virus" is when I have been manually TRYING to infect a system in order to reverse engineer what the damn thing does (in order to create cleanup packages for work). These are in non-networked VM's where we also re-image the host afterwards. But really - a secure USER is what we need. The OS won't make all that much difference compared to the user.
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I don't care how secure your OS is, if users are going to click on SomeFamousPersonNaked.exe , then they are going to eventually get owned - "secure" OS or not. We've all heard the "Linux doesn't get attacked much because it has an insignificant market share" and sort of argued around it - maybe the real one is "Linux doesn't get attacked much because the average Linux user knows enough to not click on ridiculous shit that gets emailed to them."
No. Linux and MacOS do not get attacked, because normal users don't run with the sort of privileges that would allow the virus (or trojan as in your example) to do very much damage or replicate itself.
Similarly, replication of such a virus becomes even more difficult, as E-mail clients and servers both generally tend to block attachments containing executables...
Sure, there are mechanisms for it to happen, but trojans generally don't spread very fast or very far. A true "virus" typically utilizes an OS e
Re:Why should this upset them? (Score:5, Insightful)
Sure, it can't burn itself into the registry or equivalent, but it sure as hell can replicate itself. Hell, it can even cause a lot of headaches when you're lazy like me and have a whole drive mounted in
Trojans are a different beast, of course, as they rely on the OS more heavily.
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In the Windows case, I hope you have a backup because its time to re-install Windows.
PS, rkhunter is a great example of a program that detects for real Linux infections, for those looking.
Re:Why should this upset them? (Score:5, Insightful)
WTF? Any program I run has +rw access to ~ (can start itself from .profile, do arbitrary damage to all the files I actually care about, and steal passwords and the like) and the ability to connect(2) to random parts of the internet (ability to replicate, send passwords, and fetch ads). No privileges beyond this are needed to cause trouble.
The real reason is probably more to do with the size and average competency of the userbase.
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But what happens when we actually DO accomplish full-on Linux on the desktop? What happens if, hypotheti
Privileges are needed (Score:4, Insightful)
There's not need for elevated permissions.
No there is need. Under Linux a non privileged software has only access to high-level network access, such as opening a regular connection. There's no low-level access to network (crafting the data packets as wished) for non privileged software.
Thus a potential running virus, *COULD* connect to its C&C if it receives its orders from an IRC channel.
But the virus won't be able to create spoofed packets (used for sophisticated bounces and DDOS) or specially crafted packets to exploit flaws on the target system.
Whereas under Windows, non-privileged applications CAN craft packets, and users run as administrators anyway.
A non privileged process CAN download Ads from the internet, but it will have a harder time injecting them into the browser window.
An admin-privileged process in Windows could hijack the network stack and rewrite HTML on the fly inserting pop-ups and ads.
Under a non-privileged account in Linux, it can't. The virus will need instead to be able to rewrite the configuration of all gazillion of browser that exist in Linux, either injecting a spyware plugin or rerouting the traffic through a proxy process spawned by the virus. Anyway, the absence of a single point of attack, and the lack of monoculture make Linux a more complicated target.
Also, few user-friendly type distros (Ubuntu and the like) come with a sendmail (or equivalent) configured out-of-the-box for internet message delivery. Usually it's only configured to deliver alerts to the local user account.
A potential operational Spam bot would either have to send directly the spam to the internet and both hope that the network isn't configured to reject email not going out through the SMTP server and hope that the infected machine doesn't sit on a dynamic IP which will automatically get discarded on the receiving machine.
Or the potential Spam Bot will need additional complexity to retrieve the user's SMTP configuration, which will be difficult, both because there's a gazillion of different mail clients under linux, and both because several of them password-encrypt the credential (Thunderbird can do it and all KDE software store their passwords in KWallet which is masterpassword-encrypted by default).
This is security by diversity, and why it's good to avoid monocultures.
This is opposed to Windows, where most users have outlook express, which lacks the ability to encrypt the credentials.
Under Linux, it takes several step to execute code downloaded from a browser, as a reference, see the HOWTOs about downloading the latest GPU drivers straigth from the constructor site instead of using whatever is the regular package management/delivery mechanism used by the distro (you have to manually chmod it "executable". Clicking on it usually opens an editor).
And that's neglecting that it is possible to "noexec" the whole home, in which case it's not even possible to *run* code from ~.
So even if he wanted to, a linux user can't just click on "NataliePortmanNaked.sh" and execute it (unless its a regular package inside Synaptic or YaST, of course) whereas a Windows user can click on "PetrifiedWithHotGrits.exe".
Also, downloading software from random websites isn't as common in Linux as in Windows. Mostly only geeks download software for Linux and usually they download it in (controllable) source form, where anomalies could more easily get spotted.
The regular user will employ the package management system for the distro to get the needed package from the regular repository instead, as because of the diversity of Linux distros, he'll need a custom compiled packagee for the present distro,
ie.: Windows wanting kitten-powered screensaver will google around to find a page proposing some spyware infested screensaver. Anyone can download, but you *need* to be computer-literate and careful about your source to *avoid* getting undesired stuff.
The Linux users will browser Synaptic and download the package "omg-lol-ponie
Parent
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"wtf is this? You don't need network access or access to this directory, go away."
Mandatory Access Controls are coming along nicely. About time too.
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Not on Linux. (Score:4, Interesting)
As such, it is not particularly easy to download and run SomeFamousPersonNaked.bin -- you have to download it to somewhere, then you have to change its permissions, and then you have to run it -- and even then, they still don't have root.
However, for a very long time, an antivirus actually made some sort of sense on Windows, because you would have exploits from visiting a webpage or reading an email. You actually had a situation where the most security-conscious users would never use the Preview Pane, so that they could delete suspicious emails without looking at them. In that particular kind of insane world, it makes sense to have antivirus -- and that is precisely why antivirus seems so laughable now.
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We've all heard the "Linux doesn't get attacked much because it has an insignificant market share" and sort of argued around it - maybe the real one is "Linux doesn't get attacked much because the average Linux user knows enough to not click on ridiculous shit that gets emailed to them."
Which would put a very low upper limit on Linux's market share. The way Linux saves the noobs is that you don't do it in the first place, you go to add/remove programs and find the software you want there. The way Linux saves the warez-wannabes is that Linux doesn't need cracks. I'm sure that if Linux became more mainstream with more commercial software, you could have trusted shops that you could add in the same way as repositories. Think something like tucows, cnet, snapfiles etc. only for Linux. Basicly
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If you can just break your code into several hundred or thousand blocks of nonthreatening code, then all you need is a way to randomize their placement in the binary. It doesn't seem THAT difficult. You could even have it relink itself into a new binary every time it is run.
You would probably need to separate the original programming from the randomization for debugging reasons. In other words you would probab
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Managing short-term and long-term resources (Score:4, Interesting)
But what if what the antivirus vendors need is not time to study but time to come up with cures? I've worked on plenty of software where the problem was well-understood, but you could be so pestered to death by people trying to tell you there was a problem that you had no time left to work on a cure.
I don't follow this community closely, but speaking from general knowledge of software projects over several decades ...
It seems likely that these competitions do not teach the antivirus vendors what they don't know. It probably creates a firedrill internally where a long-range effort to do a substantive upgrade that would do what people wish for is side-tracked by a short-term need to make sure that people's machines are not broken into by a new stupid trick today, thanks to additional resources provided by well-meaning but "mal-informed" volunteers.
Resources are always in short supply in companies, and there's a constant need to triage between short-term and long-term planning. Events like this increase the stress on short-term projects, causing them to draw precious resources away from long-term projects. The claim that this provides valuable data to the vendors sounds like spin created by malware vendors who are chuckling all the way to the bank because they get free help from a community of people who I suspect don't realize the harm they are doing.
What they should be having is competitive events to come up with cool public-domain techniques for recognizing and stopping such malware in the general cases, thus reducing short-term strain on anti-virus vendors.
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Re:Why should this upset them? (Score:5, Interesting)
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If passed into law (this bill already has passed the house twice but never has cleared the Senate), I-SPY would make it a criminal offense punishable by fines and/or up to five years in prison for "intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, or exceed[ing] authorized access to a protected computer, by causing a computer program or code to be copied onto the protected computer, and intentionally us[ing] that program or code in furtherance of another Federal criminal offense." Similar activity that is designed to defraud or injure a person or cause damage to a protected computer, but is not conducted in furtherance of another Federal offense, subjects the perpetrator to a fine and/or up to two years in prison.
I'm fairly sure viruses would fall under at least the bold part. I have no idea how much (if at all) this is a result of lobbying by antivirus vendors.
Can you say Ralph Nader? (Score:5, Insightful)
lets translate FTFA
How about this slogan "Unsafe with any version!"
I think they are afraid that regular joe end users are about to find out that programs meant to protect your pc are always an after the fact effort which leaves you vulnerable until you update and that there is no way to keep you safe from a zero-day facebook exploit. Even the government websites can be malicious until patched/fixed.
And soon, the conclusion will be
Wow, it would be such a shame if joe bloggs end user found out the truth. tisk tisk
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Solution:
Update to version 0.93.
The vulnerabilities are reported in versions prior to 0.92.1.
Solution:
Update to version 0.92.1.
This is exactly what I was saying, and is true of all antivirus software. If you don't stay updated, you are vulnerable. The POINT was why pay so much for it?
Depends on conditions... (Score:3, Insightful)
The AV vendors who are complaining are more afraid of *other* vendors than xploits... If anything found here goes to all then it levels the playing field open source style...
Andy
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This contest will just go a little farth
Trivial (Score:3, Interesting)
Hey,why are the cops ringing at my door???
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Guess what: Your invention has already been created. AF companies have countered with "heuristic" or "behavioral" virus detection. The purpose of this exercise is to game not just the signatures, but the heuristics as well.
Bad publicity (Score:2)
Maybe they should actually fix the problems? (Score:3, Insightful)
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Since you seem to be a security expert in your own right, beyond anything Marcus have ever done, feel free to explain why this basic idea will not w
Problem vs solutions (Score:2)
Probably would be more clear if they were investigating with genetics/biological malware instead of computer one.
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All problems have solutions and practicality becomes relative to how much you want to stay virus free.
Imagine a scenario like you mentioned in which there was no known solution, no patch forthcoming from MS or AV vendors, and internet connectivity meant you would be infected.
Then disconnecting your Windows computer from the net and using another operating system might be practical even if it means you have to give up productivity.
Suffice to say
I'm sure... (Score:2)
...that Michelle Madigan would love to get an undercover report of all the big mean hackers making new viruses in Las Vegas. Too bad she was busted last time she tried to spy on Defcon.
What? A real world test? Ev1l H4x0|~z! (Score:3, Insightful)
Of course, if you find the virus out in the wild and identify it, you've already failed for a lot of people. (but I'm sure they don't like to talk about that).
This is like a safe manufacturer objecting to someone actually trying to break open a safe like a real criminal would. "What! You used a crowbar and liquid nitrogen?! You're just letting the criminals know more about cold+crowbar usage!!! You should know OUR safes protect against sledgehammers VERY well."
Get real AV vendors. Everyone already knows you can't stand up to new viruses, and only protect against the known ones. People still buy your damn software anyway, because it's better than nothing.
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I think AV vendors would rather be in the business of selling a placebo than selling a cure.
What I fear personally is recombination, where malware writers start setting up protocols for automatically and randomly exchanging code/modules with other malware without need for human intervention. That's where I feel the next explosion could come from - both in the variety of malware and the speed at which new innovations propagate across various strains. The only thing holding it back would seem to be the pr
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By Rice's theorem, proving any non-trivial property of a program is equivalent to the halting problem. Hence AV detection is an ultimately losing battle.
But then, there is no need to be able to prove 100% that the software is harmful. The simple rule could be: If you cannot proof that it isn't harmful, it's a security risk. Of course for that rule to be useful, the class of programs where you can prove it has to be large enough to allow for any useful behaviour. This certainly is hard, and maybe it's not achievable, but I don't know of any proof for that.
Note that the halting problem does not say that you cannot write a program which can tell for some algo