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PHP Security SourceForge

Malicious PhpMyAdmin Served From SourceForge Mirror 86

Posted by Unknown Lamer
from the tin-foil-hat-activate dept.
An anonymous reader writes with a bit of news about the compromised download of phpMyAdmin discovered on an sf.net mirror yesterday: "A malicious version of the open source Web-based MySQL database administration tool phpMyAdmin has been discovered on one of the official mirror sites of SourceForge, the popular online code repository for free and open source software. The file — phpMyAdmin-3.5.2.2-all-languages.zip — was modified to include a backdoor that allowed attackers to remotely execute PHP code on the server running the malicious version of phpMyAdmin." The Sourceforge weblog has details. Someone compromised a mirror (since removed from rotation of course) around September 22nd. Luckily, only around 400 people grabbed the file before someone caught it.
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Malicious PhpMyAdmin Served From SourceForge Mirror

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  • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday September 26, 2012 @09:48AM (#41464143)

    No, but if any of them md5'd it they would have caught it. And in way less time than doing a code review!

  • by lindi (634828) on Wednesday September 26, 2012 @09:55AM (#41464229)

    How would you know which md5 hash was correct? They are listed in http://www.phpmyadmin.net/home_page/downloads.php [phpmyadmin.net] which is also hosted by sourceforge.

  • by undulato (2146486) on Wednesday September 26, 2012 @09:58AM (#41464293) Homepage

    I think someone's head is in the clouds at the moment what with the recent buyout of sourceforge, slashdot et al [engadget.com]. I'm with a big ol' (12 year) open source project on Sourceforge and it's going through the migration procedure currently to the new Sourceforge look and feel - lots of problems, lots of broken stuff, unhappy admins and developers and slow response to tickets.

    There are plenty of alternatives out here now for the open source types to host their code. It might be time to start thinking about exit strategies..

  • by petermgreen (876956) <plugwash.p10link@net> on Wednesday September 26, 2012 @10:05AM (#41464373) Homepage

    If sourceforge is totally compromised you are right but still the chances of that happening are almost certainly lower than the chances of a random download mirror being compromised, so checking md5s is still a good idea.

  • Re:Duh. (Score:5, Informative)

    by xombo (628858) on Wednesday September 26, 2012 @10:14AM (#41464479)

    My experience, exactly. I can't tell you how many times I've been asked to look into a problem with a web server only to find that their logs are packed with failed login attempts pointed at /phpmyadmin. It's bad enough that it blindly installs itself as a subdirectory in every Apache vhost you run; but their lack of default password attempt limits and bans (especially given its popularity and the level of access it provides) is downright irresponsible.
    There are literally botnets that do nothing more than cruise around the internet looking for phpmyadmin installations.

  • by vlm (69642) on Wednesday September 26, 2012 @10:42AM (#41464817)

    How would you know which md5 hash was correct?

    We could reinvent the wheel, but (as usual) the Debian wizards figured it all out years ago, in this case, they solved the problem in 2003.

    You make a big list of valid hashes, GPG sign the list with a well known key that is changed every couple years or so (for a good time see Debian package named debian-keyring), and publish it.

    For a good time on a Debian box go to /var/lib/apt/lists and look at a packages file. Assuming you're using wheezy/amd64 the system won't let you install the latest 0ad package (wtf that package is) version 0r11863-2 unless the md5 hash of that package is some big ole number ending in 79eb. Also sha1 and sha256 hashes.

    For a good time see

    http://wiki.debian.org/SecureApt [debian.org]

    I can hand you a questionable looking flash drive with debian packages on it and if the multiple signed hashes match Debian's official gpg signed hash list you can trust my binaries... I can't inject something extra without Fing up at least one of the three hashs.

    Or, just go ahead and reinvent the wheel... thats a Security Best Practices that never leads to problems, rock on with your NIH self man!

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