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Oracle Databases Security

Oracle Database Redaction Trivial To Bypass, Says David Litchfield 62

msm1267 (2804139) writes "Researcher David Litchfield is back at it again, dissecting Oracle software looking for critical bugs. At the Black Hat 2014 conference, Litchfield delivered research on a new data redaction service the company added in Oracle 12c. The service is designed to allow administrators to mask sensitive data, such as credit card numbers or health information, during certain operations. But when Litchfield took a close look he found a slew of trivially exploitable vulnerabilities that bypass the data redaction service and trick the system into returning data that should be masked."
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Oracle Database Redaction Trivial To Bypass, Says David Litchfield

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  • In the industry... (Score:4, Interesting)

    by phillk6751 ( 654352 ) on Thursday August 07, 2014 @11:13AM (#47622787)
    As a developer in the industry here I can honestly say nobody in our industry would be dumb enough to use this tool. Security is very important, and i'm sure PCI compliance would be a huge issue. Unless under a dual-control situation and 4-5 physical doors from the outside world, no un-masked CC# exists except on physical card. Yes, it would be nice for that service for software developers to use as a tool for display....like in my case, to provide cleansed data to the screen without manually cleansing data....but the issue is that PCI will dictate where that data can exist, and if it's uncleansed and accessible to a DB admin or software dev, there's too much visibility. They look at it from the standpoint that if a single person has access by themselves then they're likely to steal them. I don't see why they would automatically allow search within masked bytes (at least if it's ultra sensitive).....I can understand if maybe there's a setting like (sensitive to search) so that CC#'s couldn't be brute forced, however a search for a person's last name where all but the first letter are masked would probably be okay.
  • by Zero__Kelvin ( 151819 ) on Thursday August 07, 2014 @11:35AM (#47623003) Homepage
    If the card company accepts hashes then having the hash is no different than having the card number. In other words, no, it isn't nor should it be, done that way.

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