IBM On Trusted Computing, Linux 36
An anonymous reader writes "A number of IBM's computers have been available with an "embedded security subsystem (ESS)" for some time now. This site lists three research papers regarding the new TCPA (Trusted Computing Platform Initiative) security chip developed by IBM, including the full GPL-ed source code to a Linux driver for this chip. In particular, the 'Why TCPA?' paper claims that IBM's TCPA chip is in fact of extremely limited use for DRM, as it contains no tamper resistance; the chip is designed to fend off software attacks, not physical attacks. An interesting take from a company with very solid products."
DRM == no sale. (Score:1, Interesting)
~~~
Re:DRM == no sale. (Score:4, Insightful)
There are two possibilities:
M$ software will only run on Trusted Computers.
RIAA music will only play on Trusted Computers.
MPAA(?) movies will only play on Trusted Computers.
M$ & Friends will pressure other software companies to require Trusted Computers, under the name of Security or Reliability or Legal-clarity.
Option two is that non-Trusted computers could be made illegal, there is a draft of a proposal to make this law in USA. Will it happen? The RIAA, M$, and MPAA will claim it's necessary to prevent the growing "piracy" trend.
If you do have the option of buying a general computer, you may find it's not much use. And if you put up with that, don't expect Joe Public to stand with you in solidarity, he'll be too busy bopping away to his new "enhanced" Hooty and the Blowfish CD.
Ciaran O'Riordan
Re:DRM == no sale. (Score:2, Funny)
MPAA(?) movies will only play on Trusted Computers.
You forgot "the first time" at the end of each of those sentences :).
Re:DRM == no sale. (Score:5, Interesting)
(Now gov't mandating of TCPA hw/sw is some seriously dangerous shit. Let's keep way away from there).
Re:DRM == no sale. (Score:3, Insightful)
beacuse i know its true
how many people do we all know who rushed to get windows media player 9. True example 1 "But tim - it gives them the right to delete all your Mp3's"
"Yeah but they wouldnt do that would they - and anyway it has new flashy effects".
True example 2 "But sam it is full of DRM and adds DRM to all your ripped tracks" -
"Yeah but you can switch it off - look there's an option"
"And if you beleive that then bill gates is my drinking buddy"
Re:DRM == no sale. (Score:2)
Re:DRM == no sale. (Score:2)
Security for whom? Security for MS, which will have yet another way to lock competitors out of the marketplace. Security for Disney et al., who will have a level of control over digital med
trusted computing.. (Score:3, Funny)
- bumpersticker seen on car in Microsoft parking lot
Re:trusted computing.. (Score:2)
Nope, this was a few years ago, certainly not lately.
Hey, how come you have such a high Slashdot ID? I woulda figured you'd have an older account...
Absolutely Terrific Articles (Score:4, Interesting)
These are absolutely terrific articles. Their distribution of an open source TCPA linux module satisfies a lot of concerns and questions many of us had about TCPA in a concrete and specific manner.
One concern still exists: that DRM and Palladium will be used to create a "mainstream" set of M$ applications which give people the illusion of security, while concentrating most of the information and control in the hands of the few.
The most important step people in the open source community can take next are to get a system with a TCPA chip and start developing drivers, firewall systems, proxies and applications that make good solid use of the technology: tsshd, tsquid, tsftp, thttpsd, tbsd, toggd, tnamed, texim, tkonq...
Re:Absolutely Terrific Articles (Score:4, Interesting)
And yes, it will be important to use the TCPA hardware as intended to help with client security. Open/Free Source implementations of secure tools and protocols might even support profitable services based on quality reference implementations.
Re:Absolutely Terrific Articles (Score:4, Insightful)
-> not being able to see what an application is doing
-> not being able to access an application's datafiles
-> not being able to see what information is sent out over the internet
It doesn't eliminate any of these of course.
Re:Absolutely Terrific Articles (Score:2)
Yup. That's why you're going to RTFS of the TCPA module provided, and then write your own applications.
In other words... (Score:4, Informative)
Watch out with that line of thinking... The ideal system has reasonable internal security as well. If a disgruntled employee can get access to these public/private key pairs, you're worse off than before, because you still maintain the illusion of security.
Nope (Score:3, Informative)
An employee can get to the keys, but only by hacking the hardware. A possibility (as clearly explained in the articles), but not likely. It's also questionable when getting these keys would _do_; they only seem useful for the single machine itself. And I'd presume a good admin would clear/reset any keys if the machine is transfered to another employ
Seems reasonable... (Score:4, Insightful)
I'm also shure that MediaPlayer 10 will be DRMd to the marrow but take note that in the past ridiculously encumbered online music services went titsup in no time while more reasonable services (Apple) seem to strke a balance.
In the past ID tracking such as the PentiumIII ID were dealt with properly so I don't think abuses would be tolerated. People always enjoys the empowering thought of having the option to take a free ride and imposing a "police" computer would vastly outrage the consumer base.
So long as the control on the hadware keys is left to the users I agree with this particular spin from IBM; it's just a secure smartcard system.
It still CAN be extended to require encryption and trust all the way to the DVI interface but that I think would require a heck of a business infrastructure to implement, maintain and persuasion effort.
And given IBM's perspective there's no interest in the user base to proceed in further HW lockdown... all WE would do is to sign on OUR terms a kernel build and that's it; once that's in place, the chip will process OUR keys in OUR best interest... and if some pigopolist wants force something down our throat their business model will fail (as it has repeatedly done).
I'd go for it, just for the sake of my ssh/gpg keyring, and in the future credit card numbers... do you trust an ecommerce site asking to handle it for you?)
Re:Seems reasonable... (Score:2)
Re:Seems reasonable... (Score:2)
Re:Seems reasonable... (Score:2)
Re:Seems reasonable... (Score:2)
Like cable modems... (Score:2, Informative)
Hardware attacks, I guess, are not a common senerio that hardware designers really think much about.
The big question (Score:5, Interesting)
Is there a private key that third parties know that it is impossible for the owner of the computer to know?
The paper makes it sound like all key pairs are either randomly generated or that the chip can be fed a public key. However it is a bit vague, and I suspect the answer is that there are also non-random pairs in there, where third parties know the private key but you don't. They skirt around this by saying "Bios startup is quite complex" but I think the real answer is that there unless hashes have matched up to a point these secret public keys are inaccessible.
This system is absolutely useless for security as all exploits actually cause supposedly correct programs to follow the wrong instructions. This is like claiming current systems are secure because you cannot change the microcode and invent new machine instructions. It's purpose is so that it is impossible to get any kind of modified or different operating system in there, and still be able to run DRM programs, which could decode information using the secret key.
The fact that IBM and everybody else has refused to answer this question (I think the answer here was skirted around with some bullshit about the "BIOS startup being quite complex") makes me think they are lying.
The fact that having a high-speed encryption chip is quite useful is being used to hide the real purpose. Do you really think the same people who think Winmodems are a good idea are that interested in adding hardware just to speed up a function that can be done in software?
They also make a point about the random key generation, which is interesting, because it keeps the private key completely in the hardware where no program can see it and thus be fooled to reveal it. However I am curious if this is actually a defense against any real exploits. I have not heard of exploits that involve revealing the private key of a previously-negotiated pair, most involve fooling the system into doing something unwanted through an already opened and legitimate channel, or fooling it into using another public key that the attacker already knows the private one for. Can any experts find any real exploits where a temporary and untransmitted private key was revealed? If not then I would also suspect this is a smoke-screen, attempting to turn the fact that the chip has secret keys into a benefit. I would also think that 99% of the benifit, if any, could be achieved by loading the chip with a random pair and then making sure the program has eradicated all knowledge of the pair. There have been expoits in weak random number generators, and in this case the random number generator is in hardware and no longer easily fixed.
and even the fact that you can generate key pairs
Re:The big question (Score:5, Interesting)
The paper seems to skip around the huge unanswered question: Is there a private key that third parties know that it is impossible for the owner of the computer to know?
The second paper on the page answers that question in the affirmative (sort of). The private part of the endorsement key is stored on the chip, the manufacturer may record the public part. The paper states that IBM does not currently and has never recorded endorsement keys. (Note that technically the answer to your question is "no": there would be a private key that the user does not know, but no third party would know it either. You misunderstand public key cryptography. However, your general point is well-taken, because the endorsement key could be used to implement DRM, subject to the obvious caveat the author brings up, that it would be vulnerable to local hardware attacks.)
Re:The big question (Score:2)
My interpretation of the paper is that there are no keys at all in the TPM as shipped from the factory. Of course, this could change at any time.
I do not care what anyone says, (Score:3, Funny)
You people can use all that stuff you like, I will not.
And when they finally force people to use it, in that you can not connect to other systems that DO use it unless you too use it, then that's when I become a total luddite and will just go live in the woods and live off the land...
This whole thing stinks and no one can convince me otherwise...
Trusted Computing is... (Score:2)
Not much of a driver (Score:2)
Is it possible to intercept? (Score:1)
"TCPA not for DRM" reasoning wrong (Score:1)
How could content providers recognize which reported PCR values were good, given the myriad platforms, operating system versions, and frequent software patches?
This misses the point that the content providers don't need to check all those platforms/OSs/patches. They just need to check that all these components contain a signature from an "approved" authority. Without all required signatures, the user doesn't see