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Security

Linux Security: Reflections on 2002, Eye on 2003 129

Posted by timothy from the bolting-the-doors-helps dept.
Mirko Zorz writes "Here are the reflections on Linux security in 2002 and predictions for 2003 by Bob Toxen, one of the 162 recognized developers of Berkeley UNIX and author of the acclaimed book "Real World Linux Security" already in its 2nd edition. Read more at Help Net Security."
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Linux Security: Reflections on 2002, Eye on 2003 More

Linux Security: Reflections on 2002, Eye on 2003

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  • Disappointing article (Score:4, Insightful)

    by Gogo Dodo ( 129808 ) on Monday January 06, 2003 @11:18PM (#5030308)
    That was a rather disappointing article. He only made one Linux-related prediction: that there will be a major Linux virus. Besides that, everything else was generic and not Linux specific.

    • Actually two...

      As the worldwide recession continues in 2003, budget pressures will help move the world from expensive SysAdmin-intensive proprietary solutions to Linux. Even the last two holdouts, Sun and Microsoft, have grudgingly started to embrace Linux.

    • Re:Disappointing article (Score:4, Insightful)

      by rde ( 17364 ) on Monday January 06, 2003 @11:24PM (#5030340)
      Think of it as a good sign. It's hard to write extensively on holes that don't exist. Or at least, ones that haven't been found yet. cronned apt jobbies and up2date, etc, mean that even the task up updating for newly-discovered vulnerabilities is easier, so it looks as if for the coming year, the biggest problem will be the users. Plus ca change...

    • Re:Disappointing article (Score:4, Insightful)

      by Slaven Reitmeier ( 635266 ) on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @12:46AM (#5030615)
      The predictions here were consistant with his '7 deadliest sins' which he frequently quotes. In fact, the article is in many ways just a more verbose version of them, with a few specific vulnerabilities thrown in for good measure.

      Most of the predictions were "more of the same". I seriously doubt we'll be seeing "a major Cyberterrorism event" though -- I usually expect to hear this from sensationalists, not legitimate security experts. Think Steve Gibson. [grcsucks.com] In fact, the theorized cause of these massive DDoS attacks is supposed to be windows systems, and the Raw Sockets are Evil [grcsucks.com] thread is brought back to mind.

      One big unforgivable mistake in the article: there was no bug in DNS -- there was a bug with BIND [isc.org]. Anyone using nameservers or libraries that were not part of BIND were unaffected. The fact that he assumes BIND is the only DNS server in the world is a big mistake, and one of the reasons DJBDNS [cr.yp.to] doesn't get enough airtime.

      Overall, I didn't see anything in the article that I didn't already see a hundred other places.

      Personally, I'd like to hear what the authors of Hacking Linux Exposed [hackinglinuxexposed.com] have to say. Their book has a lot more grit and less soft-shoeing over the topics. Real World Linux Security has always been too full of stories and not enough answers for me. (Of course I bought the 2nd edition anyway.)

      • Another reason DJBDNS doesn't get much airtime might be related to the fact that the author of that code appears to be a raving loon hellbent on defaming BIND in general, and ISC and it's employees in specific. Anyone who has followed the bind-users or bind9-users mailing lists can attest to the fact that he frequents those lists (or did fairly recently) with (apparently) the sole intention of stirring the shit every now and then. Our team was seriously considering moving all of our nameservers to DJBDNS, but after watching the antics of Mr. Bernstein, we changed our minds.

  • Near the end, end of honeypots?! (Score:4, Insightful)

    by pr0ntab ( 632466 ) <pr0ntab@gma[ ]com ['il.' in gap]> on Monday January 06, 2003 @11:24PM (#5030339) Journal
    He says that he predicts (and hopes) that the practice of using honeypots, etc. will decrease; that it only serves to illustrate to managers that security will be breached. Thus, we can assume that all sufficiently weak security will be breached eventually, ergo this practice is useless.

    He forgets the other valuable feature of honeypots. You can deploy prototype installations and observe the kinds of attacks in the wild, to get a feel for the capabilities of the advisary. These techniques change over time, and that information is invaluable when determining where effort needs to be focused in a security plan for your product.

    This short-sightedness casts doubt on some of the other parts of his essay, other than on the obvious points (to us at least, those involving Microsoft, Hollywood, the man keepin us down, blah blah blah)

    • Honeypots are awesome. (Score:5, Informative)

      by tkoney ( 639044 ) on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @01:24AM (#5030731)
      I had a very hard time convincing my manager to allow us to set up a honeypot on our DMZ. He said since no one could get there, what was the point. Three weeks later, when a hacker managed to break in via some badly written ASP programs (not my fault) it was the honeypot that send us the alerts that let us get him off our network.

      Of course honeypots can also be used to learn what hackers do. The Honeynet Project [honeynet.org] is a great place to go to learn how to set one up securely so it can't be used to attack other people.

      In fact, today a new version of honeyd [tracking-hackers.com] was released:

      As many of you already know, Honeyd is an OpenSource honeypot designed for the Unix platform. It has many featues, including the ability to monitor millions of IP addresses, detect activity on any UDP or TCP port, OS emulation at the user and kernel level, create virtual networks, and so on.

      Marcus Ranum and I are big fans of Honeyd. To make it easier for people to work with and understand this technology, we took all the necessary ingrediants together and 'cooked' them up for you, creating the Linux Honeyd Toolkit. This toolkit is a ready to go distribution of Honeyd, with statically precompiled binaries, configuration files, and startup scripts. The idea being you just update the honeyd.conf file to what you want your honeypot to look like and let her rip.

      Toxen's fear of Honeynets and Honeypots shows the "if I don't understand it, it's not good" theory I find in too many managers. He should take some time to run a honeypot or two and see how useful they can be.
      • Shit man, if I was your manager I don't think I'd let you set up a honeypot anywhere near a demilitarized zone. You're just asking for trouble. :p
      • I read his comments differently. He wasn't against honeypots, he just felt they were overdeployed. I think if you don't have a lot of time to devote to building and maintaining one they are of limited value. It may be more time saving to copy the defenses of those who do take the time to learn the latest exploits. Face it, if you don't spend a bunch of energy on your IDS then it's a toy.
    • A honeypot is not the best way to test the security of a prototype installation either. The time spent with the honeypot would be better spent selecting a secure platform to develop on, designing rules for writing secure code, and doing code audits and security audits, etc.

      If the honeypot is not breached is the system secure? Of course not. You have learned nothing. If you instead did that code audit and security audit then you would have more confidence that it was secure than when you started.

      I stand by my claim that for most people, the time spent on a honeypot does not have technical value.

      • Provided you:
        • Have a DMZ
        • Have a distribution for your application prototype
        • Have a reasonable approximation of a typical (or many) typical machines that would run said software prepared.

        Then, you simply take aside a sysadmin and teach her how to install your package. Give them pointers on how to do a good installation. Then, let them install it on the machines on the DMZ. Some other person will install your load testing utility on yet another server on the DMZ which will hammer the machines, simulating heavy usage conditions. You will already have this tool too, if you have been testing your code.

        Finally, do other important things. Every once in a while, check to see what, if anything, has happened to your honeypots. If they have been poked and proded at regularly, you will ONLY then spend the additional time analyzing it for faults, break-in attempts, etc.

        Moreover, if the simulated load tool suddenly complains it can't talk to your application, then you switch focus and do a postmortem analysis of the dead machine on the DMZ. You can probably discover a quick fix or weak point right away.

        The chance that you may have such a situation is valuable, and so is the knowledge that (provided the machine has been sufficiently poked at and fanagled with) it is resistant to, at least, unimaginative adversaries.

        The key is to not put more than enough effort into the application than is necessary. For certain apps, certainly the honeypot test is overkill, or unneccessary. But there will be other cases where you can dedicated a small portion of time to the setup and monitoring of a production machine, to see how it currently resists real-world stress. The question is at what point does the early testing outweigh later struggles with security updates, errata, patches, and that ilk; those things that will be discovered after it deploys.

        Of course, no app will gain critical attention until after it's released and it becomes widespread, and there it will meet the most sophisticated attempts to break in. But you don't want to give anyone the wrong first impression, when your software gets trivially borked in that first month.

        Finally, the code audit will reveal whether you have used best practices and your code meets the specs. But it won't tell you when your specs, requirements or best practices are wrong from the start. EG, there is nothing wrong at all with in.rshd, it's a tank. You can throw anything at it, and it behaves exactly as it should. But its assumptions about the operating environment (a secure network where no one can have a privledged port) is a pipe dream. Thus, it is trivially hijacked and exploited.

  • And flying cars (Score:3, Funny)

    by ObviousGuy ( 578567 ) <ObviousGuy@hotmail.com> on Monday January 06, 2003 @11:24PM (#5030341) Homepage Journal
    There will be flying cars to take us to and from work.

  • I fail to see how his predictions, which include things like large truck bombs and wide scale DDoSs, are all Linux related. It read more like Chicken Little's predictions.

  • Real World Computer Security (Score:4, Funny)

    by SuperDuG ( 134989 ) <be.eclec@tk> on Monday January 06, 2003 @11:29PM (#5030362) Homepage Journal
    1.) Use Microsoft Server Solutions and leave system alone (as risky as driving 100 mph on ice)

    2.) Use RPM based Linux Distribution and leave system alone (risky as swimming in a americanized river).

    3.) Use OpenBSD and leave system alone (like sitting on a Sunday with your grandma in Utopia(tm)).

    Is this the type of "security" they're talking about? I don't know of one system that advertises itself as "secure" other than OpenBSD. For an opensource site like slashdot I think the best tool for the job should definantelly be used.

    Or if you insist on a RPM Linux solution, ge Bastille. And possibly look into a non-RPM based distro, for servers debian certainly works quite well. And if your server is IMPORTANT at all, subscribe to bugtraq, cert, and anything else that applies to your OS. It wouldn't hurt to check the homepage of your OS at least once a week either. And do routine audits on your system.

    Security isn't hard if you actually make it a point to be conscious about it.

    • I don't know of one system that advertises itself as "secure" other than OpenBSD.

      OpenVMS/SE-VMS, OS/400, HP/UX BLS, Linux w/ Pitbull/LX, Solaris/AIX w/ Pitbull .comPack, Trusted [Solaris|Irix|DG/UX], AIX B1-EST/X, XTS/400, ...

      ok, none of these systems is totally open source, but all of them have pretty good security
    • What exactly is the problem with RPM wrt security ? What does a package format have to do with security (beside, possibly, ease of applying patch) ?

    • Huh? (Score:3, Insightful)

      by Mandi Walls ( 6721 )
      Ah, yes. Another whiny little post about RPM-based distros.

      As another responder so aptly pointed out, the package management system has nothing to do with security, unless you are using file verification as part of your security plan (which isn't a bad idea.. do "rpm -Va" for system-wide verification of all files known about in the rpm database).

      However, if you have to support real-world applications, and not just your webserver at the other end of your cable modem, there is another aspect to system security and stability, and that is THIRD PARTY VENDOR SUPPORT.

      Now, I realize that the number of guys on /. who actually do stuff for a living that doesn't include final exams is minimal. However, if my boss/engineering staff/customer wants a product for a specific purpose, say, backups, or CRM, or CMS, I don't have the power to say "well, sorry, but we only run StinkyFeet Linux, not Blue Bonnet like that vendor requires". If they don't can me, they'll just go with a Windows-based app to get around that headache.

      So then, what good does it do to have several distros around? They all run the SAME PACKAGES, imagine that! And when there is a hole in OpenSausageStuffer on an RPM-based distro, there is going to be a hole in OpenSausageStuffer on a non-RPM-based distro. The Horror!

      So instead of having one distro network-wide, which has the same version/feature set across all systems, and the same cronjobs for updates, etc, i now have several, because some fool decided that he didn't have the time to make the appropriate decisions and shut things off. hmmm...

      And that doesn't even get into the headache of trying to deploy my own packages, or dealing with the preferences of my users, or with the terms of a contract.

      In short, being a stick in the mud about distros isn't going to gain you anything. And not learning how to do your own security in favor of a crutch like Bastille isn't going to gain you anything either. Jay has a good idea, and it's great for noobs, but if I'm paying you (or if you're paying me) to secure a system you better fucking know exactly what is going on. And when security requirements change, you better be able to handle it. Relying on someone else's idea of secure is a place to start, not the final answer to your own security. Security is a process, not a product, no matter what your little imagination tells you.

      When it comes to system security, the best distro for the job is the distro you know the best, not the /. poster's favorite distro. A newbie to HandCreamBSD isn't going to be any better off than a newbie to Blue Bonnet Linux.

      --mandi

      • I was blessed with a reply by The linux chick eh. I must be stepping up in the world of commentary, or something like that.

        Okay When I said RPM-Based Linux Distributions I was refering to the "Big Three" (RedHat, Mandrake, and SuSE) all these distros come with a HUGE amount of overhead with the install of the system. Packages that are not neccessary for a security based system. Unless you specifically hold a gun to the installer's head it will install everything and the kitchen sink for the "Linux Experience (TM)".

        Distributions such as Debian, Slackware, and Gentoo, CAN use RPM, but aren't part of the "Big 3" and do have the ability to install a bare bones system install with almost nothing from the get go, making the ability to build the system up from scratch easier for the admin to maintain.

        As you noted in your wonderful reply, BSD may not be the answer, but OpenBSD is the ONLY Operating System to date that I've seen where even a newbie can rest a little easier knowing that the system is completely secure (so long as they install only what came with their CD). Why is this, because that's what OpenBSD is famous for and what OpenBSD is really good at.

        If there is a company that wants to use "EgoStroking Linux" then that is what you are going to have to work with, but I have yet to see a secure system taht doesn't following the "K.I.S.S." model (and no that's not a detroit rock band ...) "Keep It Simple and Secure" in which something that is not neccessary to the system is not installed or used and if it is installed is deleted. All dameons are run in unprivledged accounts with little or no access to the system as a whole and with communications of programs limited to what is neccessary (IE: Is there a reason to have a time server on a web box? If not then disable the thing).

        Rip up the RC's and anything else not neccessary at startup, make sure your directory permissions are tight, and for god sakes self audit your system.

        So basically we're actually in agreement, but you decided to take my "sort of a joke" comment a little too seriously.

        And I'll go to my grave saying that the most secure server is the one that is a molten goo in the middle of the earth.

  • Damn (Score:5, Funny)

    by stinky wizzleteats ( 552063 ) on Monday January 06, 2003 @11:32PM (#5030373) Homepage Journal

    Unfortunately, a fair number of "Mom and Pop" sites use IIS, though a surprisingly high percentage do use Linux. For this reason, before giving my credit card to a new web merchant I always do:
    nmap -O -sS -F -P0 -T Aggressive newguy.com

    Stealth port scan with agressive timing? Now that's consumer activism.

    • Re:Damn (Score:5, Insightful)

      by JoeBuck ( 7947 ) on Monday January 06, 2003 @11:54PM (#5030452) Homepage

      Yeah, and I'll bet he gives his credit card to waiters in restaurants all the time. The only time I've ever had someone try to use a credit card number stolen from me, it was a busboy at a local Cambodian restaurant (they caught the guy too).

    • Re:Damn (Score:2, Funny)

      by Anonymous Coward
      That's a SYN scan. Not a stealth scan. With Fast mode enabled, OS detection, no ICMP pings and aggressive timing...


      You nmap newbie.. If you were a really 31337 haxor you'd know how to use nmap. Bitch!

    • Here's an example of output:

      nmap -O -sS -F -P0 -T Aggressive www.amazon.com

      Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA31 ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ )
      Warning: OS detection will be MUCH less reliable because we did not find at least 1 open and 1 closed TCP port
      Interesting ports on 207-171-182-16.amazon.com (207.171.182.16):
      (The 1098 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
      Port State Service
      80/tcp open http
      443/tcp open https

      No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
      TCP/IP fingerprint:
      SInfo(V=2.54BETA31%P=i586-pc-linux-g nu%D=1/7%Time= 3E1B24B1%O=80%C=-1)
      TSeq(Class=RI%gcd=1%SI=1130%T S=U)
      TSeq(Class=RI%gcd=1%SI=1F64%TS=U)
      TSeq(Clas s=RI%gcd=1%SI=184F%TS=U)
      T1(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=800%ACK =S++%Flags=BAR%Ops=WNMETL)
      T2(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=800%ACK=S%Flags=AR%Ops=WNMETL)
      T3(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=800%ACK=S++%Flags=UAPR%Ops=WNMET L )
      T4(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=800%ACK=S%Flags=AR%Ops=WNMETL)
      T5(Resp=N)
      T6(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=800%ACK=S%Flags=AR% Ops=WNMETL)
      T7(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=800%ACK=S++%Flags=UA PR%Ops=WNMETL )
      PU(Resp=N)

      Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 202 seconds

  • not a major virus (Score:2, Interesting)

    by i.r.id10t ( 595143 )
    but more of an upswing in new exploits/overflows/etc as more people begin to scrutinize the code - think microsoft has anyone looking for "problems" to announce in a FUD campaign? New ways of distributing them will also be found - but even then there will be those who proclaim their immunity. "It was in an PassiveZ attachment, but since I just use an old line printer as my mail spool, it didn't get me".

  • aaaaargh (Score:1, Funny)

    by pummer ( 637413 )
    it seems we've had enough year-end recaps. What's next, the Recap of the Recaps?

  • Security predictions (Score:5, Insightful)

    by ACK!! ( 10229 ) on Monday January 06, 2003 @11:59PM (#5030473) Journal
    Yeah, people act like only MS can get infected with a virus but there will be a major linux virus soon. It is going to happen. As linux gets more exposure more schmucks will write malicious code designed for busting up linux boxes. It is not like the Unix world is some foolproof world of rock hard servers.

    After all, why did linux inherit the Unix concern for security?

    Enough old-school unix guys have been bitten by the bad security in telnet and NIS and a half dozen old world Unix services with big nasty security issues.

    Sure Bastille linux or RedHat secure server makes decent choice and OpenBSD is locked pretty tight right out of the box. That does not mean that it is impossible to break into those boxes. Just that it is more difficult. All you need is a one-day lag between a security issue posting on Cert and the patch to whatever software you are using coming up for your distro or OS. It can happen to any of us. It will happen to many of us.

    The over-confident are always the funniest to watch when their shit hits the fan.

    The honeypot thing is interesting. I have always wondered if you really get enough useful information from the attacks to warrant the time put into the systems. Somehow it just smacks of a geeky wanking waste of time. On the other hand, maybe the information from such implementations really make this worth it.

    Any comments on this?

    • Re:Security predictions (Score:4, Insightful)

      by zatz ( 37585 ) on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @01:11AM (#5030687) Homepage
      I think the executable versions, library versions, and specific configurations of services vary a lot more between Linux boxen than Windows hosts. There is much less of a monoculture problem, so it is more difficult for any single worm to infect a large fraction of hosts.

      Still, as Linux slowly gains desktop market space and the level of security awareness of the average user declines, it is conceivable that it will become more hospitable to Nimda/Klez-scale worm epidemics. Also Linux tends to run more services; a Windows 98 box is very difficult to compromise remotely because it has almost no interfaces to subvert. We probably won't be at the same level of susceptibility as Micros~1 platforms for a while, though.

  • Talking about Linux security... (Score:3, Informative)

    by fungus ( 37425 ) on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @12:13AM (#5030518)
    You guys should know that a trivial remote root hole for SSH was released today on bugtraq.

    Someone who wants karma bad enough should reply to this with the advisory :)
    • well, was a fake exploit. unlike the many unpatched MSIE/Windows holes ;-)

    • Re:Talking about Linux security... (Score:4, Informative)

      by fungus ( 37425 ) on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @12:27AM (#5030549)
      ERRATA:

      --- begin cut & paste ---

      To: BugTraq
      Subject: Re: OPENSSH REMOTE ROOT COMPROMISE ALL VERSIONS
      Date: Jan 6 2003 8:05PM
      Author: Global InterSec Research
      Message-ID:
      In-Reply-To:

      As some may have gathered, the advisory recently posted by mmhs@hushmail.com
      was indeed a fake, intended to highlight several unclear statements made in GIS2002062801.

      The advisory in question is currently being updated with more detailed information and will
      be
      re-posted at: http://www.globalintersec.com/adv/openssh-20020628 01.txt as soon as it becomes

      available.

      Note that the kbd-init flaw described in GIS2002062801 was proven to be exploitable in our lab
      although not all evidence to demonstrate this was provided in the original advisory. A mistake
      was made in the original advisory draft, where chunk content data was shown, rather than the
      entire corrupted malloc chunk. This will be amended in the revision.

      Also note that to our knowledge there are currently no known, exploitable flaws in OpenSSH 3.5p1,

      due to its use of PAM as suggested by mmhs@hushmail.com. It is almost certain that the posted
      bogus advisory was also intended to cause alarm amongst communities using OpenSSH, through
      miss-information.

      Global InterSec LLC.

      --- end cut & paste ---

      The original advisory I was talking about can be found here [securityfocus.com].

      Sorry for misguiding you, humble slashdot readers.
    • I dont care about karma, but the "advisory" refers mainly to some Cisco gear with the vulnerability. All the other SSHs (Open, etc.) are fine.

      This outta be "-1, Stupid"

    • Re:Talking about Linux security... (Score:5, Informative)

      by Florian Weimer ( 88405 ) <fw@deneb.enyo.de> on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @03:41AM (#5031080) Homepage
      You guys should know that a trivial remote root hole for SSH was released today on bugtraq.

      The posting appears to be a fake. (I wonder why your snake oil alerts didn't go off...)

  • Too many services? (Score:3, Informative)

    by pben ( 22734 ) on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @12:50AM (#5030629)
    I really think that this Toxen guy should quit spouting on about SuSE installing too many services by default. None of the services he complains about is installed by default. He needs to really download and install a Linux distribution that has been released in the last couple of years. You have to turn on the services now at least for SuSE 8.1. He may have written some good stuff in his day but he should do some research before he makes a fool of himself in print.
    • My reference was SuSE 8.0, which was the most recent this summer when my book was written. Even something as simple as restarting IP Tables rules is done wrong in SuSE.

      SuSE first flushes existing rules and then adds new rules. Thus, for a short time there are no rules but the default for each chain is ACCEPT. They are saved only because networking has not yet been turned on. I suspect that this is more of an accident than intent because the correct solution is to first set the defaults to DROP, then add rules, then change the defaults to ACCEPT if that is your desire.

      There are other weaknesses in the current SuSE.

  • Obligatory... (Score:1, Troll)

    by KewlPC ( 245768 )
    In SOVIET RUSSIA, 2003 has its eye on YOU.
  • Really, is Linux a Secure OS(tm)? No, not really. It's not as popular as Windows, and the security model is better developed than Windows (courtesy of the Unix legacy), which leads to it having fewer exploited exploits, but...

    Is it really that much more secure? Not really.

    The key to security is implementation. Solaris isn't inherently incredibly secure. Secure Solaris is. Linux? Nah. the NSA Linux? I imagine so!

    FreeBSD (and the other BSDs even) was designed with the intention of being secure, and so it is far moreso. So is NSA Linux and Secure Solaris. That ha nothing to do with the inherent security of the base product, though.
    • I found this [techtv.com] interesting.

      Especially this qoute:

      "In 2002 Microsoft issued 34 advisories for Windows XP, and 37 advisories for Windows 2000. By comparison, Red Hat Linux saw 87 advisories for its OS and Sun issued 83 alerts for Solaris."

      It says nothing about the severity of the alerts but on sheer numbers, it's thought provoking.
      • I've always been convinced that this was more about which vendors were willing to actually announce that they had problems and try to fix them, rather than any meaningful measure of quality. Sun has always announced and released more patches by sheer number than IBM or HP, for example.

  • Help net security: Toxen's Publicist (Score:3, Interesting)

    by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @01:00AM (#5030655)
    Help Net Security seems to be Bob Toxe'ns personal publicist. Let's see, they wrote and submitted the RWLS book review [slashdot.org], performed at least one interview [net-security.org] with him, drove people to their site to win free RWLS books [net-security.org]. Now, how many other Linux experts have they interviewed and plugged? Can you find any references to Building Secure Servers vith Linux (Bauer, a damned fine book) or Hacking Linux Exposed (Hatch, also excellent)? Or even a note about inferior books, such as the Red Hat security/optimizing one, or Maximum Linux Security? How about an interview with Ziegler of "Linux Firewalls" fame?

    Nope, seems to me Toxen's pseudonym is "Zorz".

    • I also have hired several "in print" Linux mags, a UNIX org and Slashdot to provide publicity.

      Seriously, I have no business, financial, or other connection to Help Net Security. They had the idea for the book giveaway and contacted Prentice Hall, my publisher, to request the copies. If you write a book they consider worthy, I'm sure that they will talk about it and invite you to write articles. Zorz is not a pseudonym for Toxen. My only web sites are

      http://www.realworldlinuxsecurity.com

      and

      http://www.verysecurelinux.com

  • Comment removed (Score:5, Interesting)

    by account_deleted ( 4530225 ) on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @01:02AM (#5030660)
    Comment removed based on user account deletion
    • I think the fact that the Sendmail server was broken
      into and serving trojaned copies of the source
      certainly does reflect badly on Sendmail's security.
      If they can't secure their distribution machine,
      how well can they code umpteen years of crappy code?


      Of course, in spite of the OpenSSH bugs, I'd use them any day before the ssh.com code.

      • Comment removed based on user account deletion

        • OpenSSH server not run by OpenSSH crew (Score:3, Informative)

          by Anonymous Coward
          The OpenSSH server is not run by the OpenSSH team, it's a university machine. Yes, it was broken into. It's running Solaris, not OpenBSD either, in case you're curious. They use it because it has bandwidth.

          Naturally, you should check the pgp signature and/or cryptographic checksums before trusting any code you download.

          There are still bugs in SSH.com's version - mostly stability, but I bet there are several security bugs too. OpenSSH will be updated several hours after new bugs are found - can you say the same for SSH.com's versions? I don't think so, not if history is a guide.

    • I don't think any of the things he listed as vectors for a new Linux virus are realistic. There are too many different mail clients and instant messangers. On the other hand sendmail, apache, or bind would make great vectors. Even if their security is good all it takes is one flaw. And nobody is perfect.

  • Any mention of SELinux [nsa.gov]? On that subject, it could use some testing on more Linux distros, if anyone else is interested.

    Man Gets 70mpg in Homemade Car-Made from a Mainframe Computer [xnewswire.com]

  • Linux securty? Be more specific. Kernel | Userland (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @02:06AM (#5030827)
    All security is an issue of the userland software, not necessarily the Linux kernel itself. The userland software in question is: all of it.

    Software that uses suid bit set will still be susceptible to leaving control to the "root" user after it crashes. Telnet and SSH still allows people to do bad things, as well as good things, to the hosted account's property.

    Alas, the Linux kernel is a perfect angel...but hark, what do I see? A "Tux" http server in kernel space? That is quite dangerous. No matter what the performance benefits, leave those kind of user-services outside of the kernel because each and every bit of code in kernel land makes the Linux kernel that much more closer to an "unknown" exploit. /other than that, the userland tools taste like chicken and the kernel still smells like hering.

    • Re:Linux securty? Be more specific. Kernel | Userl (Score:4, Informative)

      by octogen ( 540500 ) <{g.bobby} {at} {gmx.at}> on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @02:48AM (#5030956)
      The userland software in question is: all of it.

      No, only suid binaries. You don't hack into something which runs in the context of your own account (your own level of access).

      Software that uses suid bit set will still be susceptible to leaving control to the "root" user after it crashes

      That's the difference between a secure configuration of common OSs like Linux, Free/Net/OpenBSD,... and really secure OSs like VMS or Trusted Solaris (yes, Unix can be a really secure OS).

      Secure OSs don't run things as root, they assign privileges to certain users and/or binaries instead. For example, you don't want to allow Apache to override the Discretionary Access Control when it actually only needs 'root' to open port 80.

      On Trusted Solaris you just do 'setfpriv -m -a -f net_privaddr /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd' and noone would ever get something like root by hacking into your apache webserver.
      That's how the 'principle of least privilege' works.

      There is mainly one thing wich keeps your system secure: Access restrictions (users must not load kernel modules, mount disks, access files which they're not allowed to access, ...). But access restrictions can't protect your system from users/processes who are privileged to override these restrictions, and that's why you need fine grained privilege controls to build really secure OSs.

  • "Worldwide recession" (Score:4, Insightful)

    by Sara Chan ( 138144 ) on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @03:14AM (#5031021)
    The article talks about "the worldwide recession". A recession is typically defined as two consecutive quarters (i.e. six months) of negative GDP growth. The Economist [economist.com] gives the most-recent GDP changes data [economist.com] for each of 19 different Western countries (sorry, not free). Only two are negative (Denmark and Norway). The most-recent quarterly GDP change for the the Euro area is +1.3%; for the USA it is +4.0%.

    There is a rationalization going on in business IT. This is not a recession at all.

  • Wow. Another uneducated whitehat. (Score:4, Informative)

    by mcroot ( 634911 ) on Tuesday January 07, 2003 @04:55AM (#5031213)
    Perhaps he should start by reading bugtraq. If he had, perhaps he would have seen this hole in ssh.com's lovely software in 2002.
    http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/6247

    Or, who can forget this unbeliavably idiotic mistake in their client from 2001
    http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/3078

    Yet he call's it more reliable that OpenSSH. Maybe he should look into the nice new privsep code in OpenSSH and comment on that. So called security experts make me wish public floggings were still a common event.
  • Linux is terrible at enforcing least privilige. With kernel changes, such as those provided by RSBAC or LIDS, you have the power to enforce much better privilige control, but it's all up to the user. What we really need is a mainstream kernel that supports ACLs and auditing on failed reads and a distribution that ships packages that have nice restrictive ACLs by default, for daemon users. That way, access can be given to only those files that they require and you can find out when they try to access a file that they shouldn't. Given proper default ACLs, a SINGLE deny read in your logs should indicate a compromise. That simple level of auditing would improve the security of Linux by at least an order of magnitude (well, assuming that someone's watching the logs, of course :)
  • I'm tired right now, but wasn't it the RIAA goons and not Microsoft? Correct me if I'm wrong.
  • I Can't Believe It's Not Buffer!
  • Toxen is recognized for developing the BSD lock(1) [freebsd.org] program.

  • Toxic, indeed (Score:1, Offtopic)

    by xrayspx ( 13127 )
    The article struck me as a simplified rundown of what's been happening. Which is good, because that's what it was supposed to be.

    Getting into recommendations, however... Saying that everyone should NMAP with OS detection every e-commerce site they go to is pretty unsound advice. Besides which, he's making a huge blanket statement that IIS admins all suck, and that any site using IIS/MS on the backend is a huge risk that no one should take.

    He must not buy much on the web then, unless he keeps a root shell around to run with -O. Quicker to just use NetCraft [netcraft.com].

    But even the characterization of all the Operations staff at Ebay, Staples.com and Barnes and Noble as being completely inept soup-fed-droolers, since they run IIS and therefore are risking their customers, is childish and whiny. Why should I trust a Linux admin over an NT admin, in the context of ECommerce? One would hope that if Barnes and Noble runs an ECommerce site, that they would have the foresight not to hire a wet behind the ears MCSE.

    If Staples, bn.com, and Ebay all get owned, I might have to rethink my rant I guess...

    The way towards security is not in me as an admin saying "Buy Linux servers, they're going to be 'secure'". The way towards security is in an admin saying "What you running, w2k? We can secure that". Security is not a product, and Linux does (clearly) not equal security.

    • xrayspx fails to explain his statement of why a consumer should not use NMAP to do a quick security assessment of a site he is considering trusting with his credit card data. He also puts quite a few words in my mouth.

      I said nowhere in my article that "IIS admins all suck" nor any comments on their ability. However, with minor hardening and good practices, a Linux web server mostly is at risk for compromise due only to a vulnerability discovered every year or more. From reports I've seen, an IIS server is at risk from a new remote compromise almost weekly. This represents a ratio of roughly 52 to 1 in risk.

      I made no claims about the Operations staff at eBay, Barnes&Noble, etc. It does appear, however, that B&N uses special content-based filtering in front of their IIS server. The NMAP scan will show such special filtering by its inability to determine the operating system. No doubt they also have people on the ready 24x7 to instantly apply new patches.

      I also never said "Buy Linux servers, they're going to be 'secure". I do believe "Start with Linux, then harden it as per 'Real World Linux Security, Second Edition', subscribe to bug tracking lists, patch quickly, and you will be much more secure, spend far less effort, and spend less money than dealing with Microsoft". UNIX, Macs, and other platforms also have a good history of security if hardened.

      • You stated that you refused to use any online service running IIS. That seems a bit on the xenophobic and fanatical side.

        I would certainly trust bn.com with my money. There is no reason for me to high-tail it to Amazon simply because bn.com uses IIS.

        The Average User running nmap is another matter entirely.

        The Average User would have to install WinPCAP. Unless the average user is running Linux in this case, where nmap must be run as root to use the -O switch.

        Shortly, there is no reason for the average user to have nmap installed on their machine (linux or Win32). Same reason that the avg. user doesn't know how to use TCPDump, Ettercap, etc. NetCraft is easily accessible by anyone.

        Of course, nothing's perfect. NetCraft goes by banners largely, so you end up with sites like Walmart.com, running IIS5 on Linux or Solaris.

        Posting from work, I didn't have the time to respond past a quick rant. Nor did I ever expect a reasoned response. I really appreciate the fact that you took the time to read the article here and reply to posts, that says a /lot/ about your veracity. Good stuff.

        Thanks.

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